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ABSTRACT
The determination of a death-row inmate's competency
to be executed is a compelling ethical issue for mental
health professionals.

It has been suggested that forensic

psychologists who offer such services to the courts may tend
to approach the problem of determining competency by diverse
and unstandardized methods

(Grisson,

1986).

Heilbrun (1986)

has questioned the effect of the psychologist's potential
death penalty bias on the outcome of the evaluation
process.
Death penalty attitudes have a demonstrated effect on
the decision-making processes of capital jurors who are
death-qualified,

(willing to impose the death penalty under

some circumstances) or excludable (unwilling to consider the
death penalty under any circumstances)
Ellsworth,

(Fitzgerald &

1984).

The present study surveyed Ph.D. clinical psychologists
specializing in forensic services to the courts to determine
which characteristics associated with the inmate (mitigating
factors and behavior on death-row) ; the capital crimea g g r a v a t i n g factors); or the evaluating psychologist
(death-qualified or excludable) might be related to the
final decision of the inmate's competency to be executed.
xii

Results indicated that death-qualified but not
excludable psychologists were significantly more likely to
assess an inmate as competent for execution when the inmate
had committed a premeditated or a heinous crime or when the
inmate had been diagnosed as a sociopath.

The competency

decisions of the death-qualified psychologists were not
affected by the presence of any mitigating factors, whereas
the excludable psychologists appeared more likely than the
death-qualified to consider mitigating circumstances,
although the relationship did not achieve statistical
significance.
The results were interpreted within Wrightsman's

(1991)

assertion that the "first dilemma" between law and
psychology is belief in the protection of the rights of the
accused versus protection of society at large.

The

sensitivity of death-qualified psychologists to aggravating
factors may tend to indicate that they might align
themselves on the side of protecting society at large while
the excludable psychologists who are so strongly opposed to
the death penalty that they would refuse to consider
imposing it even under extraordinary circumstances of crime
might tend to align themselves with protection of the rights
of the accused.

xiii

INTRODUCTION
For approximately a decade, from 1967 to 1976, the
United States experienced a moratorium on capital
punishment.

When state statutes were revised in 1976 to

make the death penalty "discretionary, after consideration
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" rather than
mandatory for specified crimes, the United States Supreme
Court held that such statutes no longer violated the Eighth
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment
(Gregg v. Georgia, 1976).

With this intended safeguard in

place, state after state reenacted death penalty laws that
were eventually ruled constitutional, resulting in a rapidly
increasing number of inmates under death sentence across the
United States
1986).

(Lewis, Pincus, Feldman, Jackson & Bard,

This number grew by almost 200 during 1984 (Bureau

of Justice Statistics Bulletin,

1985); totaled 1,714 as of

May 1, 1986 (Ward, 1986), and the most recent estimate
indicates that over 1800 men and women currently reside in
United States prisons awaiting execution (Valeriani, 1987).
Some of these individuals have lived under sentence of death
for more than a decade while exhausting legal avenues of
appeal.

It has been widely noted that confinement on death

row causes extreme physical and psychological stress
(Gallemore & Panton,

1972; Bluestone & McGahee,
1

1962).

For

2
example, it is estimated that half of the more than 200
condemned prisoners in Florida become intermittently
psychotic (Sherill, 1984).

Recently, the states have begun

to hear pleas that prolonged confinement has rendered many
inmates incompetent to be executed.
Ford v. Wainright, (1986) affirms the right of the
condemned to be spared execution while mentally incompetent,
and validates state laws requiring psychological/
psychiatric evaluation and treatment of capital inmates who
plead that they have become insane while awaiting execution
(Mossman, 1987).

With the rapidly increasing population

under death sentence, the issue of competency for execution
is likely to be raised with increasing frequency in the
coming years.

This creates some compelling ethical issues

for the mental health professions.
The involvement of mental health professionals in the
death penalty process has sparked a great deal of
controversy concerning what ethical role, if any, they might
have in these procedures.

Two basic polarized positions

have emerged (Appelbaum, 1986; Radelet & Barnard, 1986).
The proinvolvement position regards such assessments as
inevitable; pointing out that capital punishment is
presently a social and political reality in this country.
They make the case that assessments should be performed by
psychiatrists and psychologists who are well-trained,
experienced, highly skilled, and willing to do a thorough

3
evaluation while maintaining a sharp awareness of the need
for legally and ethically relevant protection for the
individual being assessed (Appelbaum, 1986).

The

consequence of abstaining from such evaluations, it is
argued, is that the evaluations will then be performed by
those who are less qualified and less likely to do a
balanced job.

In contrast, the anti-involvement position

holds that involvement by clinicians in such assessments
places them too close to the administration of punishment
and threatens to compromise the public's perception of their
primary treatment role (Radelet & Barnard, 1986).

In view

of the traditional commitment of mental health professionals
to the practice of healing, some commentators have concluded
that psychologists and psychiatrists who render such
services are exceeding the scope of ethical practice.

To

date, however, there is nothing in the formal ethical codes
of either profession to prevent psychologists and
psychiatrists from participating in decision-making in this
life-and death context.
The ethical debate surrounding the execution of an
insane convicted capital defendant however, has not been
limited to the medical/mental health professions.

Since

medieval times, the Anglo-American law has forbidden the
execution of individuals "presenting insane" (Ewing, 1987).
While the rationale for this ancient rule of law is somewhat
obscure, the justifications cited by the courts and
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commentators for excluding the incompetent from execution
clearly appear to concern ethical issues in a broad context.
Justifications for Competency for Execution
The exclusion of the incompetent from execution is
based in common law dating back to the 13th century.

Among

the reasons originally cited for this exclusion were:
a) religious (executing an incompetent prisoner did not
allow him to put his spiritual affairs in order); b) humane
(the notion that madness is punishment enough); and
c) societal (executing the severely disturbed individual
reflected badly upon society)

(Broderick, 1979; Larkin,

1980).
In more recent times, the notion of retribution as
justification for execution has been impugned where the
incompetent inmate is concerned, since most states have
ruled that retribution cannot be fully achieved when a
convicted criminal is unaware of the

elationship between

his crime and his punishment (Ward, 1986).

Additionally,

the potential inability of the incompetent prisoner to
provide information to or otherwise assist counsel in
ongoing appeals has been cited as an exclusionary argument,
based on the rationale that executions should not occur
until all possible appeals have been exhausted (Heilbrun,
1987).

A "psychological" exclusion has been adopted by many

states as well, and is based on the argument that
individuals have the right to progress through the various
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"stages of death" as described by Kubler-Ross in 1969.

When

the convicted inmate cannot conceptually prepare for death,
it is argued, the result is an inhumane fear without
understanding (Heilbrun, 1987).

As a result of considering

the preceding arguments, the United States Supreme Court has
recently ruled that execution of the incompetent would
violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986).
The Impact of Ford v. Wainwright,

(1986)

The procedural problems in determining competency for
execution have been significant.

The United States Supreme

Court, in Ford v. Wainwright, (1986) ruled that the due
process protections provided by Florida's procedure for
determining competency for execution were inadequate.
Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death in 1974.

Over the course of 8 years on Florida's

death row, Ford became increasingly more bizarre in his
ideations and behavior, resulting in his attorney formally
raising the issue of his competency to be executed in 1983
(Heilbrun, 1987).

The governor appointed the "commission of

three psychiatrists" that was required under the state
statute to assess Ford's competency.

A joint interview

one-half hour in length was conducted by the psychiatrists.
They were provided with a portion of the trial transcript, a
medical history, and the results of two previous psychiatric
evaluations.

Based on this limited data, two of the three
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examining psychiatrists concluded that Ford was psychotic.
The third believed that he was "grossly exaggerating his
symptoms" but concurred that Ford was competent to be
executed.

Three separate reports, one from each examiner,

regarding the findings and conclusions were submitted to the
governor, who arbitrarily ruled that Ford was indeed
competent and set in progress the motion for execution
without any further evidence.

Ford was not granted benefit

of a hearing to challenge the findings or the basis of the
governor's conclusion (Heilbrun, 1987).

It was this

procedure that the United States Supreme Court determined
did not adequately protect the prisoner's right to due
process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Other

inadequacies were cited as well, most notably, the nature of
the mental health assessments and the selection process of
the examiners who administer them (Heilbrun, 1987).
Regarding the former issue, the nature of mental
competency exams, clear delineation of the questions
examiners should be addressing to determine competency was
not established by Ford v, Wainright.

Recently, however,

some investigators have given to the challenge and Grisso
(1986) has proposed a model that delineates the following
questions as essential for clarification if the competency
process is ever to achieve a standardized format:

1) What

functional abilities are necessary to be competent for
execution?

2) What is the situation in which competency
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must be demonstrated, i.e., does the relevant legal task
involve only the act of execution or should it also include
assisting counsel in post-sentence appeals?

3) What is the

nature of the relationship between the observed deficits and
the client's legal abilities?

4) What is the interaction

between the client's particular abilities and specific
demands of the situation?

5) What is the determination by

the legal decision-maker regarding the person-situation
incongruence and is it sufficient to warrant a finding of
incompetence?

6) How will the authorized decision-maker's

findings impact on the client?

The potential utility of

such a model has directed attention to how the current legal
standard's among states fit into its' framework.

A survey

of statutes and procedures on competency for execution in
the 41 states permitting capital punishment revealed that 23
have statutory proscriptions against executing the
incompetent, of these 23, two require the inmate
''understand” , another four have judicially adopted the
common law proscriptions, i.e., that the inmate "understand
and assist", four have recently repealed statutes, leaving
case law supporting the common law rule, and six more have
general statutes requiring the transfer of mentally ill
inmates to a mental hospital if they become "insane",
"incompetent", or "unfit."

Two states have a death penalty

but no law relating to competency for execution, and the
final two remain "undetermined" (Ward, 1986).

Clearly,
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there is little existing consensus between states regarding
the assessment of competency for execution.

While the Ford

decision did not provide an explicit standard on which
questions of competency should be based, minimally, it has
served to stimulate research into the formulation of such
standards, such as Grisso's (1986) model.
Regardless of the standard used, the competency for
execution question often falls into the hands of mental
health professionals.

The majority of state procedures

require that psychiatrists and other mental health experts
such as physicians and psychologists examine the i* mate and
make a determination as to competency for execution.

These

procedural codes, however, contain varying degrees of
specificity regarding the thoroughness of the examination,
their adversarial character, the independence of the
evaluators, and whether the findings should be declared in
writing.

In four of the 16 states providing for

psychiatric/psychological examinations, the examining body
is the ultimate judge of competence (Ward, 1986).

In the

remaining 12 states, the ultimate decision-maker is the
court, the governor, the governor and appointed council, or
a jury (Ward, 1986).

In two states the inmate is examined

by an undefined commission.

In three states the inmate is

evaluated by state hospital officials who make the final
determination, and the final three states have statutory
provisions that the court will evaluate and decide the issue
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(Ward, 1986).

The past decade has witnessed the growing

usage of mental health testimony and/or psychological
evaluations in the courtroom.

One recent report, for

example, estimated that 25,000 evaluations of competency to
stand trial were conducted by professionals in a single year
in the United States (Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone, Davis, &
Robbins, 1982).

It seems reasonable to expect that mental

health examiners will play an ever-increasing role in
competency issues.
Unfortunately, investigators have yet to respond to the
latter issue raised by the Ford decision:

consideration of

the selection process and independence of examiners who
administer such evaluations.

Certain empirical questions

that merit attention have been raised by Heilbrun (1987),
however.

For example, Heilbrun points out that during the

selection process, professionals who are "defense-oriented"
may be excluded from consideration.

Furthermore,

professionals who perform competency evaluations may foster
strong biases either in favor of or against capital
punishment.

The psychological literature is replete with

studies indicating that death penalty attitudes do not exist
in a vacuum, but are associated with a whole cluster of
attitudes, experiences, and knowledge (Cowan, Thompson, &
Ellsworth, 1984).

Such attitudes, it appears, are a symptom

of a more general cluster of social/political attitudes.
One result of these robust findings has been the
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constitutional guarantee that the sentiments of jurors
regarding the death penalty shall play a central role in
determining their competency to serve in capital cases
(Witherspoon v. Illinois; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984).

No

such guarantees exist, however, that the mental health
professional rendering expert testimony during trial
proceedings or evaluating competency for execution will not
harbor the same attitudes and biases that disqualify jurors
from sitting in capital cases.

A large body of literature

has been generated to investigate the attitudes and biases
of potential jurors.

Yet, no study to date has attempted to

measure or generalize these findings to a population with an
equally substantial, if not greater impact on the outcome of
capital cases.
Mental health professionals are increasingly being
asked to provide expert testimony and psychological
evaluations regarding the existence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in capital offenses, as well as
assessing the death-row inmate for competency for execution.
Judges place a high value on the findings from these
evaluations (Nicholson, Briggs & Robertson, 1988).

Indeed,

research suggests that the courts rarely disagree with the
competency recommendations made by members of the mental
health professions (Reich & Tookey, 1986; Roesch & Golding,
1978).

In view of the emphasis given to mental health

evaluations in court proceedings and the consequent impact
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of those decisions on the livers of defendants, there is a
pressing need for research to identify the relevant
attitudinal variables which may influence the opinions,
testimony, evaluations, and subsequent recommendations of
mental health professionals.

Given the absence of

literature in this area, it may be prudent to extrapolate
from the body of research developed to examine relevant
attitudinal variables and biases in potential jurors.
The Impact of Death Penalty Attitudes:

Death Qualification

Theoretically and empirically, attitudes of juries
toward the death penalty have consistently shown powerful
relationships with other crime control attitudes, and play
an important role in defining people's ideological
self-image in regard to their stand on criminal justice
(Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Smith,
1976) .

These attitudes may influence either or both phases

of the capital murder trial.
There are two stages in a death penalty proceeding.
The first stage is the determination of guilt or innocence,
and resembles any other criminal trial (Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, 1984).

If this process results in the

defendant's conviction of a potentially capital murder, then
in most states the jury must deliberate gain, to decide
between life imprisonment and the death penalty (Woodson v.
North Carolina, 1976).

One consequence of this special

arrangement is that death penalty trials differ from other
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criminal trials in the questions asked during "voir dire"-the examination of prospective jurors to determine their
suitability for a particular case.

Each member of a capital

jury experiences, through voir dire questioning the process
of "death qualification."

Death qualification represents an

extended discussion of penalty at the outset of a criminal
trial, before any evidence has been presented (Haney, 1984).
In essence, prospective jurors are asked to reflect upon and
to predict their own behavior during a possible penalty
phase of the trial.

They are asked specifically whether

they are so opposed to the death penalty that they cannot
consider imposing it in any case.

Prospective jurors who do

express such an opinion are dismissed by the court and
excluded from participation as jurors in that case.

Thus,

jurors who ultimately are seated in a capital case are
deemed "death-qualified", i.e., willing to consider and
impose the death penalty under some circumstances.
Furthermore, they have been repeatedly exposed to the death
penalty questioning of themselves and others, and typically
have witnessed the dismissal of several prospective jurors on
the basis of their death penalty attitudes (Haney, 1984).
Critics have contended that this procedure creates juries
that are more likely than ordinary criminal juries to favor
the prosecution's point of view.

Furthermore, they contend,

these "death-qualified"" juries are unrepresentative of the
communities from which they are drawn (Fitzgerald &
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Ellsworth, 1984).

Subsequently, the first test-case of

death-qualified jury bias was presented to the United States
Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, (1968).
The Impact of Witherspoon v. Illinois,

(1968)

The defendant, Mr. William C. Witherspoon, contended
that the jury that sentenced him to death had been biased in
favor of conviction prior to sentencing (Gross, 1984).

He

argued that a juror who is undisturbed by sentencing a man
to death is the kind of juror who would also tend to ignore
the defendant's presumption of innocence and accept the
prosecution's argument and reach a verdict of guilty.
Witherspoon presented drafts of three unpublished empirical
studies to support his argument.

Each study suggested that

those who favor the death penalty are more likely to vote
for conviction during the determination of verdict phase of
the two-phase capital offense trial.

The Supreme Court,

however, disagreed with Witherspoon’s contention.

They

believed that the evidence presented by the defense was too
fragmented and tentative to establish a relationship between
death penalty attitude and conviction-proneness during the
determination of guilt.

Surprisingly, with no specific

empirical backing, the same court readily concluded that
Witherspoon's rights had indeed been violated; but in the
determination of penalty phase.

By excluding all opponents

of the death penalty, they argued, the state had "crossed
the line of neutrality' and created "a tribunal organized to
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return a verdict of death."

The Supreme Court's decision

did not specifically rule on the constitutionality of the
death-qualification process; rather it limited its usage.
As a result, a standardized set of questions have emerged
known as "Witherspoon Criteria" that is commonly employed
during the voir dire procedure today (Gross, 1984).

In

accordance with the Supreme Court ruling, this criteria is
designed to eliminate from capital juries only those jurors
who make it unmistakably clear that;

a) they would

automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be
presented during the trial; and, b) that their attitude
toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an
impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt (Gross,
1984).

The Witherspoon decision was a landmark case in that

the Supreme Court suggested that the conviction-proneness of
death-qualified juries was an open empirical question,
susceptible to scientific resolution.

Moreover, the

Justices concluded "a defendant convicted by such a jury in
some future case might still attempt to establish that the
jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt.

If he

were to succeed in that effort, the question would then
arise whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty
issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may
be vindicated at the e x c u s e of the defendant's intern
a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence"

in
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(Bersoff, 1987).

It is very rare for the Supreme Court to

leave open an issue in this way, and rarer still for the
Court to issue such an invitation to social scientists to
develop data to help it in resolving a crucial point of
constitutional law.

Investigators swiftly responded to this

challenge, and by 1986 a far larger body of data and studies
on the subject was available.

The scientific soundness of

three decades of social science research that indicated that
the absence of jurors with moral or religious scruples
against imposing the death penalty created a jury that was
pro-prosecution and therefore conviction-prone was at issue
when the Supreme Court ruled on Lockhart v. McCree, (1986).
The Impact of Lockhart v. McCree,

(1986)

McCree, the defendant in the base, was convicted of
capital murder in Arkansas in 1978 and sentenced to life
without parole (Bersoff, 1987).

Because the state

originally sought the death penalty, eight prospective
jurors were excluded from McCree's jury because they
revealed that they had scruples preventing them from
imposing the death penalty under any circumstances.

The

death-qualified jury convicted him, but at the penalty state
of the trial the prosecution changed its mind and sought
only the life sentence it obtained.

After McCree's

conviction was affirmed in the Arkansas Supreme Court, he
sought
court.

..it of habeas

pus from the federal district

His argument was that social science data now
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provided that the death-qualified jury that convicted him was
"conviction-prone," in violation of his constitutional
rights.

He called three expert witnesses in his behalf, two

of whom were psychologists.

The district court, and then

the Court of Appeals, relied extensively on their testimony
as well as on numerous published studies regarding
death-qualified juries, many by psychologists.

The Court of

Appeals concluded that "the consistency among all of the
studies over a wide range of survey methods and respondents
is impressive" and invited the Supreme Court to review the
case (Bersoff, 1987).

The petition was granted.

The

American Psychological Association (APA), after a strong
recommendation by its Committee on Legal Issues and
consultation with social scientists involved in the issues,
decided to enter the case as a Friend of the Court and
prepare a brief in which APA would fairly, fully, and
objectively inform the Court concerning the three decades of
research on the prosecution-proneness of death-qualified
juries.
In its brief APA abstracted and critiqued the
methodology and major empirical findings of the relevant
research on the conviction proneness of death-qualified
jurors.

Two major arguments were asserted (Bersoff, 1987).

In the first argument, APA stated that the 80C7.nl scic
data presented by the defendant demonstrated that
death-qualified juries are more pro-prosecution and
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unrepresentative than typical criminal juries and that
death-qualification impairs jury functioning.

The second

argument asserted that contrary to criticism, the social
science data presented satisfied applicable criteria for
evaluating the soundness of scientific research.

It

rebutted arguments condemning the use of statistical
significance, provided evidence that the data were not
limited to simulation studies, answered the claim that the
data were suspect because researchers had used different
methodologies to examine their hypotheses, and responded to
the claim that the positive results were mainly the result
of experimenter bias.

APA concluded that the research in

question was methodologically sound, reliable, and useful in
adjudicating the central issues in the case (Bersoff, 1987).
There were two legal issues before the court.

The

first was whether the exclusion during the guilt/innocence
phase, of jurors, who are adamantly opposed to the death
penalty but who could be fair and impartial as to guilt in
the latter phase of the capital trial creates a less-thanneutral, prosecution-prone jury.

Were this the case, then

the defendant would be denied due process, in violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The second issue was

whether the exclusion of these same jurors created a jury
that was unrepresentative of the community and less than
properly diverse, violating the Sixth Amendment's
requirement that juries represent a fair cross-section of
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the community.

The Supreme Court refused to hold for the

defendant on either claim.

The Court rejected as "illogical

and hopelessly impractical" the defendant's claim that
juries that exclude those who are adamantly opposed to the
death penalty violate due process because the resulting
juries are less than neutral with respect to guilt and favor
the prosecution.

An impartial jury, the Court said,

"consists of nothing more than jurors who will
conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."

The

defendant had conceded that each of the death-qualified
jurors that convicted him had met that criteria.

Regarding

the latter claim of a fair cross-section, the Court ruled
that the Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section
of the community does not preclude exclusion of groups who
are "defined solely in terms of shared attitude^,"

Only the

exclusion of groups defined by immutablt characteristics
such as race or gender, and thus rejected on grounds
"completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group
to serve as jurors in a particular case gives rise to an
appearance of unfairness" (Bersoff, 1987).
APA was concerned that the Supreme Court would use this
case as a vehicle for condemning social science evidence in
judicial decision making.

While that did not occur, the

majority did find "several serious flaws" in the social
science evidence introduced.

Of the 15 studies cited by the

defendant and relied on by the lower courts, the majority
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found that only six "even purported to measure the potential
effects on the guilt-innocence determination of the removal
from the jury of those adamantly opposed to the death
penalty.

"It called eight of the nine remaining studies

"only marginally relevant" to the constitutional questions
are issue, because they dealt sclely with "generalized
attitudes and beliefs about the death penalty and other
aspects of the criminal justice system."

Of the 6 studies

perceived by the Court as relevant, three had been
introduced in 1968 in Witherspoon v. Illinois and rejected
as "too tentative and fragmentary" at that time and,
according to the Court, remained so.

The Court complained

that the three new studies did not use actual juries
deliberating in actual capital cases.

Finally, the majority

indicated that only one of the six relevant studies included
jurors who could not be fair and impartial as to guilt
because of their adamant opposition to the death penalty,
calling the rest "fatally flawed" as a result.

At the end

of its critique of the social science data, the Court said,
"We will assume for purposes of this opinion that the
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to
establish that death-qualification in fact produces juries
somewhat more conviction-prone than non-death-qualified
juries.

We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does

not prohibit the states from death-qualifying juries in
capital cases" (Bersoff, 1987).
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Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes:

A Review of the

Literature
Critics believe that the death-qualification process
creates juries that are more likely than ordinary criminal
juries to favor the prosecution.
tested this hypothesis in 1984.

Fitzgerald and Ellsworth
A survey was administered

to persons eligible for jury duty in Alameda County,
California.

The respondents were contacted by phone using

random digit ceiling.

An interview was then conducted on

these respondents for the purpose of achieving a reliable
estimate of the size of the group whose opposition to the
death penalty would exclude them from capital juries under
Witherspoon Criteria, and to assess the effects of their
exclusion on the attitudes and demographic characteristics
of prospective jurors at the start of a capital trial.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that Witherspoonexcludable jurors would be more likely to support dueprocess values, while "death-qualified" jurors would be more
likely to emphasize crime control values.

Due process

values emphasize the fallibility of the criminal justice
system in apprehending, trying, and convicting lawbreakers.
Due-process also emphasizes the rights of the accused
individual and stresses the fact that a defendant is
innocent until proven guilty.

Those who adhere to crime

control values, on the other hand, believe that the most
important function of the criminal justice system is
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repressing crime.

They believe that laws require strict

enforcement, and that the criminal system should deal
swiftly and efficiently with large numbers of criminal
suspects.

They contend that the effectiveness of the system

hinges on the efficiency of the police and prosecutors.

To

them, the presumption of innocence is seen as an obstacle to
the punishment of those assumed to be guilty (Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, 1984).

Furthermore, these authors speculated

that excludable jurors would have less punitive attitudes
than "death-qualified" jurors, and that they would be more
open to certain criminal defenses.
To classify the respondents in the study as
death-qualified or excludable, three questions were used to
determine attitude toward the death penalty and Witherspoon
eligibility.

the first question asked respondents to rank

themselves on a four-point continuum, from strongly opposed
to strongly favoring the death penalty.

The next question

required the respondents to assume that they had been called
as possible jurors for a case in which the prosecution was
asking for the death sentence.

A question was also asked

which would indicate which respondents would be classified
as disqualified because they could not be fair and impartial
in deciding guilt because of his/her attitude toward the
death penalty.

These jurors are known as "nullifiers" and

were eliminated from the sample before the death-qualified
and excludable jurors were compared.

Thus, the survey
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consisted of an examination of the population of jurors who
could make up their minds about the guilt of a defendant in
a fair and impartial manner.

Within this population, jurors

who would be willing to consider imposing the death penalty
were compared to those who would not.
Likert-format items were designed to measure due
process and crime control beliefs by testing specific
attitudes toward the right to protection from
self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, the burden
of proof, the exclusion of inadmissible evidence, and
prejudicial pretrial publicity.

Measures were also obtained

to indicate the respondent's punitiveness, willingness to
consider the insanity defense, and feelings about the
opposing counsel.
Demographic data was also collected, in order to
determine whether or not death qualification
disproportionately eliminates minorities and other distinct
groups from capital cases.
Results indicated that 17.2% of the total 717 fair and
impartial jurors were considered excludable under
Witherspoon.

Furthermore, the excludable respondents were

more likely that the death-qualified respondents to agree
that it is better for society to let some guilty defendants
go free than to risk convicting an innocent person.

Death-

qualified respondents were more punitive than excludable
respondents and were more likely to favor harsh punishment
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in reducing crime.

The death-qualified were also more

likely to believe in strict enforcement of all laws, no
matter what the consequences.
Based on other survey questions, death-qualified
respondents were significantly more likely to trust district
attorneys and to distrust defense attorneys than were the
excludable respondents.

On the question of insanity; death-

qualified subjects consistently reported that it was a
loophole designed to allow the guilty to go free.
Demographic data revealed that blacks were more likely
to be excluded under Witherspoon than were any other racial
group.

Women were excluded more often than men, and both

the less educated and the well educated were excluded more
often than respondents having some high school education or
a high school diploma.
While Fitzgerald and Ellsworth's 1984 study indicated
that jury attitudes have the potential to predict verdicts
in capital cases, the mystery of why this was true was not
unraveled.

Consequently, Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth and

Harrington (1984) designed two investigations to further
examine the phenomenon.

Initially, they hypothesized that

jurors who favor the death penalty may tend to interpret
evidence in a way more favorable to the prosecution than do
jurors who oppose the death penalty.
Subjects were drawn from a pool of individuals who were
eligible for jury service in the state of California and who
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also had participated and been determined death-qualified or
excludable in a previous study conducted by Cowan, Thompson
and Ellsworth (1984).

A video tape of a simulated trial was

created that showed a prosecution witness and a defense
witness giving contradictory accounts of the same incident.
After watching the tape, subjects completed a 16-item
self-administered questionnaire which included four types of
questions.

Questions 1 through 3 measured the subject's

perception of the credibility and truthfulness of the two
witnesses.

Questions 4 through 9 asked which witnesses'

story was most plausible with respect to specific facts
about which there was conflicting testimony.

Questions 10

through 13 asked subjects about what inferences they had
drawn about events leading to the trial that occurred in the
tape.

Questions 14 through 16 asked about subject's

attributions regarding the character and personality of the
two witnesses in the tape.

Subjects indicated their

responses on a 6-point Likert-type scale.
Results indicated that the death-qualified subjects
evaluated the evidence in a way more favorable to the
prosecution than did the excludable subjects.

Death-

qualified subjects were significantly more favorable to the
prosecution witness on two of the three questions dealing
with the credibility of the witness, two of six questions
about the plausibility of specific factors, all four
questions regarding inferences drawn from facts, and two of
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three questions regarding attributions about the witnesses.
The second phase of the study tested the hypothesis
that death-qualified jurors have a lower threshold of
conviction.

This was based on a theoretical model of

decision making by jurors which assumes that a juror's
threshold of conviction is related to the amount of regret
he or she associates with erroneous convictions and
erroneous acquittals.

The model assumed that the greater

the regret associated with erroneous convictions, relative
to erroneous acquittals, the higher the threshold of
conviction.

Subjects who had participated in study one also

participated in study two.
The "Regret Scale" questionnaire asked subjects to
indicate how much regret they would feel in 16 hypothetical
situations.

The scale was numbered from 0 to 100, 0

indicating no regret and 100 indicating the most regret.

In

each of the 16 situations, the subjects were asked to
imagine their jury had reached one of four verdicts in a
homicide case (guilty of first degree murder, guilty of
second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty)
and that the defendant was later proven actually to have
been guilty of one of three levels of homicide or not
guilty.

Among the 16 situations there were four correct

verdicts, where the jury convicted the defendant of the
crime he actually committed and 12 errors.

Six of the

errors were on the side of leniency (acquittal or conviction
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of a guilty defendant of a lower-level crime than he had
actually committed).

Six of the errors were on the harsher

side (defendant was innocent but found guilty, or was
convicted of a higher offense than was actually committed).
Results indicated that excludable jurors expressed more
regret when a mistake was made which resulted in a harsher
decision than did the death-qualified jurors.

Additionally,

excludable jurors showed less regret when an error was made
which resulted in a more lenient decision than did those
jurors classified as death-qualified.
The preceding studies tend to indicate that generally,
death-qualified jurors tend to hold crime-control rather
than due-process values, and thus believe in a system of
justice that convicts large numbers of criminals without
regard to the legitimacy of the insanity defense (Fitzgerald
& Ellsworth).

Furthermore, the studies suggests that one

reason for this propensity lies in the way death-qualified
jurors evaluate and respond to the presentation of evidence
(Thompson, et al., 1984).

It is during the penalty phase of

a capital trial that such evidence is presented and
considered, and it is often the role of the mental health
professional to provide expert testimony and psychological
evaluations regarding these aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.

Therefore, it seems plausible that the

existing literature examining death penalty attitudes and
juror's responses to aggravating and mitigating circumstances
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in capital trials has a bearing on attitudinal biases
professionals may hold which could conceivably influence
their testimony.
Death Qualification and Juror's Responses to Aggravating and
Mitigating Circumstances
In the penalty phase of a capital trial, the jury hears
evidence regarding aggravating circumstances that make a
particular murder even worse than the "typical" first degree
murder.

Evidence pertaining to mitigating circumstances is

presented as well, i.e., factors that could be seen as
lessening the responsibility of the defendant.
Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) tested the hypothesis
that death-qualified individuals would be more influenced by
aggravating circumstances, while excludable jurors would be
more influenced by mitigating circumstances.

Two studies

were conducted; the first consisted of 157 males and 168
females who had been called for jury duty in the Superior
Court of Wake County, North Carolina.

The subjects were

first asked to express agreement or disagreement with one of
four positions concerning the death penalty, assuming that
the defendant had already been convicted of first degree
murder.

The positions were as follows:

1) the juror would

never consider the death penalty under any circumstances;
2) the juror was opposed to the death penalty but would
consider it under some circumstances; 3) the juror favored
the death penalty, but would consider not imposing it under
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some circumstances; and finally, 4) the juror would always
impose the death penalty for first degree murder.
Twenty items were used for testing the hypothesis.

Ten

aggravating and ten mitigating circumstances were taken from
the North Carolina Criminal Procedures Act (15a-200), and
reworded into a six-point Likert format with responses
ranging from strong agreement to strong disagreement.

The

circumstances employed were the ten most often used
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
aggravating circumstances were:

Examples of

"It is worse to kill

someone for money than it is to kill someone out of anger or
passion"; and, "The sentence should be greater for someone
with a long record."
were:

Examples of mitigating circumstances

"It would be reasonable to give a person a lighter

sentence if he or she committed murder under the influence
of mental or emotional stress"; and, "We probably should not
treat a 13-year-old boy who intentionally kills someone the
same as we would an adult."
The result revealed significant sex, race, age, and
education effects on attitude toward the death penalty.
Females were significantly more opposed to the death penalty
than were males.

Blacks opposed the death penalty more than

whites, and subjects under the age of 45 were significantly
more opposed to the death penalty than those over the age of
45.

Subjects with post-college education were significantly

less in favor of the death penalty than those with less than
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a high school education.

The results also indicated a

strong relationship between level of belief in the death
penalty and acceptance of mitigating circumstances, but no
relationship between level of belief in the death penalty
and acceptance of aggravating circumstances.
The second study was a replication of the first.
Subjects were 151 male and 166 female jurors serving on jury
duty.

The materials were identical to those in study one,

except for the addition of a death-qualification procedure
adopted, with minor changes from the official Witherspoon
Criteria.
With respect to aggravating circumstances, results
indicated a significant difference between death-qualified
and excludable jurors over all aggravating circumstances.
There was not, however, a significant overall difference
between death-qualified and excludable jurors with respect
to mitigating circumstances.

With regard to one specified

mitigating circumstance, however, excludable jurors did show
significant agreement as compared to death-qualified jurors.
The item dealt with the issue of showing leniency to a
defendant who may have had some type of emotional
disturbance at the time of the crime, an important factor
often presented in capital hearings.

Excludable jurors were

significantly more willing to accept emotional disturbance
as a mitigating circumstance than were the death-qualified
jurors.

Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) therefore suggested
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that individuals with a death penalty bias foster differing
receptivity to evidence supporting aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, than individuals who are
fundamentally opposed to the. death penalty.

The death-

qualified individual appears to be oriented toward accepting
the idea of aggravating circumstances and rejecting the idea
of mitigating circumstances.
The mounting of a mental illness defense is a
frequently employed mitigating circumstance, and the mental
health professional plays an integral role in this process.
The professional providing expert testimony and
psychological evaluations appears to have a powerful
influence in insanity acquittals (Boehnert, 1985).

Research

demonstrating the correlates of insanity acquittals reveals
that the professional's recommendation appears to be the
single most important factor (Baunach, 1983).

If a

clinician recommends a finding of insanity, a defendant has
about an 80% chance of either being adjudicated "not guilty
by reason of insanit\r" or having his case dismissed
(Steadman, Keitner, Braff & Arvanities, 1983).

In contrast,

when a professional recommends against a finding of
insanity, a defendant has only a 1% to 2% chance of such
adjudication or dismissal (Howard & Clark, 1985).
Death-Qualification and the Insanity Defense
Based on Fitzgerald and Ellsworth's 1984 findings
previously reviewed suggesting that death-qualified
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individuals regard the insanity defense as a loophole
allowing too many guilty people to go free, Ellsworth,
Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson (1984) conducted a study to
further examine the tendency of death-qualified and
excludable jurors to vote for conviction in cases in which
the defendant's sanity was the major defense.

Furthermore,

these authors wished to determine whether or not the origin
of the insanity would be considered by the subjects.

Would

organically based mental illness be viewed as more
legitimate than a mental illness with a purely psychological
basis?

It was hypothesized that the death-qualified jurors

would be less likely to accept an insanity defense than
would the excludable jurors.
Thirty-three adults eligible for jury duty in
California participated.

They were determined death-

qualified or excludable based on Witherspoon Criteria.

Each

subject read four summaries, each one page long of homicide
cases in which the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity.

Order of presentation was randomized.

Two of the

case summaries involved non-organic disorders (acute
schizophrenia and paranoid schizophrenia) and two of the
cases involved organic disorders (limited intelligence and
psychomotor epilepsy).

After reading each case, the subject

answered questions about the applicability of the five
elements of the American Law Institute (ALI) test of legal
insanity then in use in California courts:

1) presence of
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substantial mental disease or defect, 2) at the time of the
crime, 3) causing the crime, due either to 4) the
defendant's inability to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his/her conduct, or to 5) the defendant's
inability to control his or her actions well enough to obey
the law.
Subjects were asked to assume that they were jurors in
this case, and were to follow the law set forth to them by
the judge.

For three of the cases, the instructions

required the subject to find the defendant not guilty if he
or she was legally insane according to the ALI criteria.
In the case of the epileptic, the judge's instructions
consisted of the legal test of unconsciousness, adapted from
the Standardized California Judges Instruction Manual.

The

defendant was to be judged not guilty if he or she was
unconscious at the time of the crime.

This would be the

case if the person's conscious mind was not functioning even
though the person may appear to be conscious.

If evidence

raised a reasonable doubt about the consciousness of the
defendant at the time of the crime, then the person should
be deemed unconscious.
Following the judge's instructions, the subject was to
reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty.

The subject was

also asked to indicate his or her response on a 40-point
verdict scale with labels ranging from "Defendant should
certainly be acquitted" to "Defendant should certainly be

33
convicted.”

Finally, subjects were asked:

a) what

percentage of the defendants who plead not guilty by reason
of insanity really were insane, and, b) In general, how
reliable is psychiatric testimony.

Responses were rated on

a 7-point Likert scale.
Results clearly indicated that subjects who would be
excluded from jury service were more likely than the deathqualified subjects to vote for a verdict of "not guilty by
reason of insanity" in the two cases involving non-organic
defendants (acute and paranoid schizophrenics).

The

difference clearly disappeared in the cases in which
insanity was based on a purely organic disorder (limited
intelligence and psychomotor epilepsy).

There was a

significant difference between the death-qualified and
excludable individuals in response to the question asking:
What percentage of defendants who plead guilty by reason of
insanity really are insane?

Subjects who were excludable

estimated that on the average, 55% are "really" insane,
while death-qualified individuals estimated that 30% met
that criteria.
In a number of states, a convicted capital defendant
may not be sentenced to death unless the state proves to a
jury that the defendant is "dangerous", i.e., likely to
commit further acts of criminal violence, thereby posing a
risk to the community in the long run (Warrell, 1987).
Typically, such proof has been presented in the form of
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written evaluations or expert psychiatric/psychological
testimony that the convicted defendant is in fact,
dangerous--a practice the United States Supreme Court has
held to be constitutional (Ewing, 1987).

This raises the

issue of which defendant characteristics or crime
characteristics the mental health professional may believe
indicates dangerousness on the part of the defendant, and
contributes to the professional's willingness to conclude
that the defendant should indeed be considered for the death
penalty, if convicted.

Although the literature is scant

concerning this issue, two studies suggest that heinousness
of the crime and impulsivity on the part of the perpetrator
may contribute to the perception of dangerousness.
Hester and Smith (1973) studied the effects of a
mandatory death penalty on the decisions of simulated jurors
as a function of heinousness of the crime.

Differences

between death-qualified and excludable jurors were not
assessed in this case.

The subjects were 70 male and 81

female students enrolled in afternoon and evening classes at
a community college in Seattle, Washington.

A possible

confound in this study existed in that the potential jurors
were not tested according to Witherspoon or any other
criteria determining eligibility to sit in capital offenses.
Therefore, it is possible that any number of the students
would be disqualified from jury duty due to their personal
death penalty attitudes.
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A 2x2x2 factorial design was employed.

The independent

variables were heinousness of crime, presence of a mandatory
death sentence, and sex of the simulated juror.

Two

scenarios were generated to allow for control of evidence,
extraneous information, and characteristics of the
individuals involved.

The heinous condition involved the

repeated shooting of a child on a school playground.

The

non-heinous condition involved a single gunshot wound to a
gang member during a gang war.

After reading the scenarious

of the crime and the details of the murder trial (identical
statements made by the defendants) the subjects were told to
assume they were members of a jury and were asked to render
a verdict.

Following their verdict, the subjects were asked

to rate on 5-point scales:

a) their degree of confidence in

their verdict (ranging from "not at all confident" to
"certain"); b) how potentially dangerous they considered the
defendant to be (ranging from "not at all" to "extremely
dangerous"); c) if guilty, how personally responsible they
consider the defendant to be (ranging from "not at all" to
"completely responsible") and d) in the imprisonment
condition, which sentence they would recommend on the
following scale:
(4) 30 years,

(1) not guilty,

(2) 20 years,

(3) 25 years,

(5) 35 years, and (6) life imprisonment.

Results indicated that subjects in the mandatory death
penalty condition rendered an overall rate of 30% guilty
verdicts compared with 50% in the imprisonment condition.
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Within the gang war murder condition, the imprisonment
condition resulted in 48% guilty verdicts compared with 20%
in the death penalty condition.

Within the heinous murder

condition, the imprisonment condition had a 50% conviction
rate as compared with 39% guilty verdicts in the
death-penalty condition.
significant.

This difference was not

The only sex difference found was in the gang

war imprisonment condition.

The females' conviction rate

was 30% compared with a 73% rate by the males.

A post

verdict questionnaire revealed that men were more confident
of their verdicts.

A separate 2x2x2 analysis of variance

was computed on the questionnaires of only those who had
judged the defendant guilty.

The results showed that

subjects perceived the defendant in the heinous murder to be
significantly more dangerous to society than the defendant
in the gang-war murder condition.

These results support the

contention that in the case of a truly heinous crime,
feelings of outrage and anger toward the defendant, as well
as the perception of him as being highly dangerous to
society attenuates strong biases of opposition to the death
penalty among potential jurors.

Thus, heinousness of the

crime may be one variable that tends to influence the
perceptions of dangerousness among mental health
professionals.

At least this contention has some intuitive,

if little empirical support.
Paradoxically, numerous studies published over the past
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half century have consistently reported that violent
criminals were better--not worse--parole risks than were
nonviolent criminals (Heilbrun, Heilbrun & Heilbrun, 1978).
Furthermore, one study found that the rated impulsivity
index of the crime was a positive predictor of parole
success (Heilbrun, Knopf, & Bruner, 1973).

In fact, Stanton

(1969), actually identified the impulsive nature of the
violence involved as the theoretical basis for explaining
why murderers were especially good parole risks.

He

concluded that their criminal acts were motivated by
momentary passion, aroused under extraordinary conditions,
and the loss of control involved in the murder was an
exceptional circumstance unlikely to be repeated.

One

aspect of the methodology common to all of these parole
outcome studies, however, has been the use of a limited time
frame within which parole outcome was determined.

While the

tracking period ranged from 6 months to several years, in no
study were all parolees followed until the outcome was
confirmed by discharge (success) or a return to prison
because of criminal recidivism (failure).

Heilbrun,

Heilbrun, & Heilbrun (1978) designed a study to rectify this
methodological flaw and to investigate more directly the
relationship between criminal impulsivity, and parole risk.
Several predictions were made based upon prior theoretical
proposals and empirical evidence relating deficits in
self-control to violence and parole failure, among them:

38
a) criminals committing more impulsive murders while
represent poorer parole risk than criminals committing more
premeditated murders; b) impulsive murderers will be more
likely to violate parole by committing another violent crime
than premeditated murderers.
The records of 164 male criminals were examined with
each subject meeting three criteria;

1) incarceration in

the Georgia prison system following conviction for murder,
2) subsequent parole from prison and 3) parole completion,
either by successful discharge or by termination due to a
technical violation or commission of a new crime.

The

sample included 58 whites and 106 blacks and represented all
paroled murderers for whom there were final parole decisions
in the three year period between 1973 and 1976.
The impulsivity-premeditation variable was measured by
means of ratings by the two junior investigators from the
circumstances surrounding the crimes, gathered by the
arresting authorities at the time of the crime's commission
and contained within the parole board files.

Impulsive

murder was defined as the killing of another in which the
thought or instigation to act did not arise prior to the
immediate commission of the fatal aggression.

Premeditated

murder was defined as the killing of another in which the
thought and instigation to act had occurred before the
immediate situation involving the homicide.
The ratings were made along a four-point scale ranging
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from "clearly not planned and clearly a spontaneous act"
(score = 1) at one end to "clearly planned and clearly not a
spontaneous act" (score = 4) at the other.

The intervening

points were intended to convey less clear situations in
which the killings were probably spontaneous (score = 21) ,
or were probably planned (score = 3).

The reliability of

the impulsivity ratings was ascertained by having the judges
rate 20 of the records in common.

The high correlation

between the 2 independent sets of judgments (r = .94)
indicates a very satisfactory level of agreement for the
impulsivity scores.
Success on parole was defined by discharge, whereas
failure involved return to prison following either technical
violation of parole or criminal recidivism.
Factor analysis revealed that those who failed on
parole had committed more impulsive homicides than those who
subsequently were successful.

The predicted relationship

between prior impulsive violence and parole failure was
confirmed.

Over twice the number of impulsive criminals

failed on parole than were successful, whereas, almost equal
numbers of premeditated murders were successful and
unsuccessful.
To answer the question "Does the impulsivity of the
prior homicide bear a relationship to the occurrence of
violent crime?"

The impulsivity scores for the violent

recidivists were compared to those obtained for the
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remaining parole violators.

The violent recidivists

received a mean impulsivity rating of 2.83 compared to a
mean score of 1.97 for all other parole violators.
difference is highly significant:

This

men who broke parole by

committing another violent crime had more likely performed a
premeditated act of murder than other parole violators, a
finding opposite the author's predictions.
The mixed results of this study accentuate the lack of
precision and uncertainty of predicting "dangerous" in the
violent offender.

Whereas there was a tendency for

murderers who had failed on parole to have committed more
impulsive acts of homicide than murderers who were
successful, murderers who subsequently were arrested for
another violent crime while on parole had engaged in more
premeditated acts of homicide than had murderers who
breached parole by committing a nonviolent crime or by
technical violation.

It appears that at present, the

question of the relationship between impulsivity and
dangerousness remains unanswered.
Implications of the Jury Literature for Competency
Assessments
Ellsworth and her colleagues have developed the main
body of research on death-qualified juries and the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that her findings appear valid
(Bersoff, 1987).

These findings have repeatedly

demonstrated that individuals who favor the death penalty
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tend to be more conviction-prone, favor the prosecution, be
more concerned with crime control than due process, and
mistrust the insanity defense.

Heilbrun (1987) has implied

that "defense-oriented" and "prosecution-oriented"
psychologists exist as well and has expressed concern that
professionals who perform competency for execution
evaluations may foster strong biases either in favor of or
against capital punishment.

Death penalty biases have also

been found to influence what has traditionally been
considered the domain of the psychologist providing expert
testimony and written evaluations, that is, the willingness
to accept aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
insanity defense.
Empirical studies have frequently relied on measures of
heinousness and premeditation to present aggravating
circumstances and measures of impulsivity and pathology
ranging from "emotional disturbances" to "insanity" to
represent mitigating circumstances (Luginbuhl & Middendorf,
1988).

The results have generally suggested that

individuals who favor the death penalty are more oriented
toward accepting the idea of aggravating circumstances (e.g.,
heinousness and premeditation of the crime) as justification
for executing the defendant and rejecting the idea of
mitigating circumstances (e.g. , impulsivity and pathology)
for finding the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity
(Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988; Ellsworth, et al., 1984).
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Proposal
The precise influence of the perceptions of
heinousness, premeditation versus impulsiveness of the
crime, and pathology of the defendant on the willingness to
accept the insanity defense has not been clearly
established.

Not has the role these factors play in the

decision-making processes of psychologists been
systematically investigated.

The current body of

literature, however, in demonstrating relationships between
death penalty attitudes and willingness to accept or reject
aggravating (heinousness and premeditation) and mitigating
(impulsiveness and pathology) circumstances tends to suggest
that these factors are all interrelated and influential in
the decisions made by jurors.

It seems possible that these

same variables may be heavily weighted in the decisions of
psychologists rendering services to the courts, such as
evaluating death-row inmates for competency for execution.
The present study was designed to investigate
attitudinal death penalty beliefs held by psychologists and
examine the variables that may affect their decisions
regarding the insanity defense and competency for execution.
To achieve this end, the following research questions were
addressed:
1.

Are the mental health professionals who are
qualified to perform competency for execution
evaluations death-qualified according to current
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legal standards, or would they be disqualified
from jury duty in a capital offense due to death
penalty bias?
2.

Do death penalty attitudes and death-qualification
affect the decisions of psychologists in
evaluating competency for execution?

3.

How does psychopathology of the defendant affect
the decisions of psychologists in determining
competency for execution?

4.

Are there interactions among impulsivity,
heinousness of crime, premeditation, and the
defendant's known psychopathology with regard to
the clinicians' decisions regarding competency for
execution?

METHOD
Sub j ects
Ph.D. Clinical Psychologists specializing in forensic
services were identified from the 1989 National Register of
Health Service Providers.
this criteria.

A total of 2353 psychologists met

Of this number, 1976 (84 percent) were male

and 376 (16 percent) were female.

Based on this wide

discrepancy in number, and demonstrated sex differences
pertaining to death penalty attitudes (Luginbuhl &
Middendorf, 1988), male subjects only were identified and
then randomly selected using a table of random numbers
between 1 and 22.
Materials
All subjects received a questionnaire packet with a
self-addressed, stamped, return envelope.

A consent from

invited participation on a voluntary basis and provided an
explanation as to the nature of the investigation (See
Appendix A ) .
Selected items from the Witherspoon criteria for deathqualification developed by Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984),
was included in each packet as part of the questionnaire
(See Appendix B ) .

Item 1 required subjects to indicate

their view of the death penalty and was on a scale from 1
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(strongly favor) to 4 (strongly oppose).

Item 2 required

subjects to indicate their willingness to vote to impose the
death penalty and was on a 2-point scale, with 1 indicating
an unwillingness to impose the death penalty and 2
indicating that the subject would be willing to impose the
death penalty.

The third Witherspoon item was omitted from

the questionnaire due to its potentially inflammatory nature
and response-biasing effect.

It would require subjects to

indicate whether or not they could remain fair and impartial
when determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
A brief social history of a capital murder defendant
with one of the following four diagnoses was included:
a) Paranoid Schizophrenia (See Appendix C); b) Anti-Social
Personality Disorder (See Appendix D ) ; c) Organic Brain
Syndrome (See Appendix E), and d) Adjustment Disorder with
anxious mood (no psychopathology)

(See Appendix F ) .

The

social histories were developed by Deitz and Brown (1990).
To validate each diagnosis, four licensed clinical
psychologists and one psychiatrist were asked to read each
social history and attach the most appropriate diagnosis..
A description of the capital crime for which the
defendant had been incarcerated followed.
were varied from:

The descriptions

a) Heinous/Impulsive (See Appendix G ) ;

b) Heinous/Premeditated (See Appendix H ) ; c) Non-heinous/
Impulsive (See Appendix I) to d) Non-heinous/Premeditated
(See Appendix J ) .

The crime descriptions were developed by
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Deitz and Brown (1990).
Finally, the defendant's current behavior on death row
was described (See Appendix K ) , including the defendant's
test scores from the Weschler Adult Intelligence
Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) and the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI).

While the current behavior

remained the same for all four death-row inmates, their
WAIS-R and MMPI test scores were varied according to the
defendant's diagnosis; a) paranoid schizophrenia (See
Appendix L ) ; b) antisocial personality disorder (See
Appendix M ) ; c) organic brain syndrome (See Appendix N ) ; and
d) adjustment disorder with anxious mood (See Appendix 0).
The test scores were developed by Deitz (1990) and were
designed according to examples of "typical" scores found
among individuals with the same diagnoses listed above
(Greene, 1980).
A questionnaire was developed by Deitz and Brown (1990)
consisting of 11 items which were designed to answer the
proposed research questions (See Appendix P).

The subjects

were asked to respond to each item based on the conclusions
they had drawn from the defendant's social history, crime
description, current death row behavior, and test scores
(WAIS-R and MMPI).

Item 1 required the subjects to rate how

heinous they felt the defendant's crime had been on a
7-point Likert scale.

One indicated not heinous at all and

7 indicated extremely heinous.

Item 2 asked the subjects to

respond to know impulsive they believed the defendant's
behavior had been during the commission of the crime.

On a

7-point Likert scale, 1 indicated not at all impulsive and 7
indicated extremely impulsive.

Item 3 requested the

subjects to rate how much impact they believed the
defendant's prior diagnosis had on the defendant's
commission of the crime in question.

On a 7-point Likert

scale, 1 indicated no impact and 7 indicated extreme amount
of impact.

Item 4 asked the subject to assess the

defendant's legal responsibility for his actions during the
commission of the crime.

A 7-point Likert scale was

provided with 1 indicating not legally responsible and 7
indicating legally responsible.

Item 5 requested the

subject to rate how likely he felt it was that the
defendant' death row behavior was malingering.

On a

7-point Likert scale, 1 indicated not at all likely and 7
indicated very likely.

Item 6 required the subject to

determine whether or not the defendant was competent to be
executed, based on the information provided.

Competent was

defined as awareness of the impending execution and the
reasons for it (Ford v. Wainright, 1986).
response was required.

A yes or no

Item 7 asked the subject to rank

order the following information sources according to

;he

effect it had on his judgement regarding competency of the
prisoner for execution:

a) social history, b) crime

description, c) current behavior on death row, and d) WAIS-R
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and MMPI test scores.

A ranking of 1 indicated the source

of information was not at all important to his decision
while a ranking of 7 indicated that the source of
information was very important.

Item 8 asked the subject

how many times in the last 5 years he had testified or
submitted written evaluations regarding the legal competency
of a defendant.

Item 9 asked the subject to indicate with a

year or no whether or not he had ever been involved in the
assessment of competency for execution and if "yes", how
many times.

Item 10 was the Witherspoon criteria asking

subjects to indicate their attitude concerning the death
penalty.

A score of 1 indicated strongly in favor, 2

indicated somewhat in favor, 3 indicated somewhat opposed
and 4 indicated strongly opposed.

Item 11 was the

Witherspoon criteria that classifies potential jurors as
death-qualified or excludable.

The subjects were asked

whether or not they would be unwilling to vote to impose the
death penalty in any case (classified as excludable) or
would be willing to consider voting to impose it in some
cases (classified as death-qualified).
Procedure
A packet was sent to each subject which included the
following:

a) consent form, b) social history of a

death-row inmate; c) crime description of a capital offense;
d) the inmate's current behavior on death row, including
WAIS-R and MMPI test scores, and e) a questionnaire designed
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to answer specific research questions.

Also included was a

stamped envelope addressed to the researcher for convenience
in returning the consent form and questionnaire.
Subjects were invited to participate in the study by
signing the consent form.
Next, subjects were asked to read the social history,
crime description, test scores, and current death row
behavior of a capital felon.

Based on this information,

subjects then were requested to answer a number of
questions dealing with the prisoner's competency to be
executed.
Subjects were requested to return the consent form and
questionnaire.

Three weeks after the materials were mailed

to the subjects, a reminder letter (See Appendix R) was sent
tn each subject who had not responded.

An additional eight

weeks were allowed for subject response before analyses of
data.

RESULTS
Return Rate and Distribution of Subjects Across Conditions
Eight hundred male Ph.D. clinical psychologists
specializing in forensic services were randomly selected to
receive survey material.

The material consisted of

manipulated variables to include 4 conditions of inmate
pathology:

paranoid schizophrenia, antisocial personality

disorder, organic brain syndrome, and adjustment disorder
with anxious mood (normal control), and 4 conditions of
crime:

heinous, non-heinous , impulsive, and premeditated.

Fifty psychologists were randomly assigned to each
condition.
Three hundred twenty-two of the 800 selected
psychologists (40%) agreed to participate as subjects and
returned completed questionnaires.

The frequency

distribution of subjects across conditions is depicted in
Table 1.
Of those who participated in the paranoid
schizophrenic condition, 42 subjects were in the heinous
condition, 36 subjects were in the non-heinous condition, 42
subjects were in the impulsive condition and 36 subjects
were in the premeditated condition.
Of those who participated in the antisocial personality
50
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Table 1
Frequency Distribution

Impulsive

Premeditated

Heinous

Non-Heinous

Paranoid
Schizophrenic

42

36

42

36

Antisocial
Personality

39

42

37

44

Organic Brain

39

42

46

35

Normal

39

43

40

42

Total

159
49. 4%

163
50.6%

165
51.2%

157"
48.8%

disorder condition, 37 subjects were in the heinous
condition, 44 subjects were in the non-heinous condition, 39
subjects were in the impulsive condition and 42 subjects
were in the premeditated condition.
Of those who participated in the organic brain syndrome
condition, 46 subjects were in the heinous condition, 35
subjects were in the non-heinous condition, 39 subjects were
in the impulsive condition and 42 subjects were in the
premeditated condition.
Of those who participated in the adjustment disorder
with anxious mood condition (normal condition), 40 subjects
were in the heinous condition, 42 subjects were in the
non-heinous condition, 39 subjects were in the impulsive
condition, and 43 subjects were in the premeditated
condition.
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Fourteen of the 322 subjects (4%) chosen not to respond
to the survey item requiring the psychologist to rate the
death-row inmate as competent or incompetent for execution.
Data obtained from these 14 psychologists were eliminated
from the sample and subsequent statistical analyses,
resulting in completed data from a total of 309
psychologists.
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency Judgements
A total of 309 psychologists responded to the
Witherspoon criterion variable regarding their personal
attitude toward the death penalty and rated the inmate's
competency for execution (see Table 2).

Of this number 57

(18%) were "strongly in favor", 114 (37%) were "somewhat in
favor", 65 (21%) were "somewhat opposed", and 73 (24%) were
"strongly opposed."

Of the 57 psychologists who strongly

favored the death penalty, 43 (75%) rated the prisoner as
competent to be executed while 14 (25%) rated him
incompetent.

Eighty-twc (72%) of the 114 psychologists who

somewhat favored the death penalty rated the prisoner as
competent for execution and 32 (28%) rated him incompetent.
Thirty-eight (58%) of the 65 psychologists who were somewhat
opposed to the death penalty rated the inmate as competent
to be executed and 27 (42%) rated him incompetent.
Forty-three (59%) of the 73 psychologists who were strongly
opposed to the death penalty believed the prisoner was
competent for execution as opposed to 30 (41%) who found him
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not competent.

Chi-square analysis of attitude toward the

death penalty and whether or not the prisoner was competent
to be executed was marginally nonsignificant, X 2 (3) = 7.34,
£ - .06.

This suggests that the personal attitude of the

psychologist regarding the death penalty was unrelated to
his judgement of the prisoner's competency to be executed.
Table 2
Effeet of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Judgement
Death Penalty Attitude
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Favor
Oppose
Oppose

JudgeTlent for
Execution

Strongly
Favor

Competent

43(75%)

82(72%)

38(58%)

43(59%)

Incompetent

14(25%)

32(28%)

27(42%)

30(41%)

Total

57

114

65

73

The results of a One-Way Analyses of Variance, however,
did reveal that the psychologists who rated the inmate as
competent for execution were significantly more in favor of
the death penalty than were the psychologists who assessed
the inmate as incompetent for execution [ F (1, 308) = 6.35,
£ < .01].

Cell means and standard deviations are presented

in Table 3.
An additional One-Way Analyses of Variance demonstrated
that the psychologists who were currently residing in states
that practice the death penalty were also significantly more
in favor of the death penalty than were psychologists who
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were currently residing in states that have no death penalty
at this time [ F (1, 321) = 9.51, £ < .002].
When the responding psychologists were classified as
death-qutlified or excludable based upon their willingness
(death-qtalified) or unwillingness (excludable) to impose
the death penalty, a One-Way Analyses of Variance revealed
that the death-qualified psychologists were significantly
more in favor of the death penalty than were the excludable
psychologists [ F (1, 321) = 226.24, £ < .001].
Table 3
ANOVA Death Penalty Attitudes:

Cell Means and Standard

Deviations

Judgement for
Execution

beath Penalty Attitude"1
Mean (Std. Dev.)
df
F
Scores
(1,308)

Competent

2.39 (1.03)

Incompetent

2.70 (1.03)

P

3.

A score of "1" indicated strongly favored the death penalty,
"2" somewhat favored the death penalty, "3" somewhat opposed
the death penalty, "4” strongly opposed the death penalty.

Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency Judgement;
As Related to Prior Psychopathology
Four separate social histories described the death-row
inmate as suffering from one of four psychopathologies prior
to the commission of the capital offense.
were:

These disorders

paranoid schizophrenia, antisocial personality

disorder, organic brain s>ndrome, and adjustment disorder
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with anxious mood (normal control).
Four 4x2 Chi-square analyses, one for each history of
disorder, were conducted to determine if the psychologist's
attitude toward the death penalty (strongly in favor,
somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, and strongly opposed)
was related to whether or not the prisoner was assessed as
competent for execution.
Within the prior history of paranoid schizophrenia,
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' view of the death
penalty and the psychologists' rating of whether or not the
prisoner was competent for execution was nonsignificant, X 2
(3) = 1.80, £ = .61.

Frequency distributions for the 4

partitions are depicted in Table 4.

These findings indicate

that within the group of paranoid schizophrenia,
psychologists' view of the death penalty was unrelated to
psychologists' determination of whether or not the prisoner
was competent for execution.
Table 4
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions:

As Related to Paranoid Schizophrenia

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Strongly
Oppose

Competent

7(64%)

13(46%)

10(48%)

6(37 %~5

Incompetent

4(36%)

15(54%)

11(52%)

10(63%)

Total

11

28

21

16
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Within the prior history of antisocial personality
disorder, Chi-square analysis of the subjects' view of the
death penalty (see Table 5) and whether or not the prisoner
was rated competent for execution was nonsignificant, X 2 (3)
= 6.40, £ < .09.

This indicates that within the antisocial

personality disorder, subjects' view of the death penalty
was unrelated to subjects' determination of whether or not
the inmate was competent for execution.
Table 5
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions;

As Related to Antisocial Personality Disorder

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Strongly
Oppose

Competent

12(85%)

24(92%)

10(62%)

16(73%)

Incompetent

2(15%)

2(8%)

6(38%)

6(27%)

Total

14

16

22

26

Within the prior history of organic brain syndrome,
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' view of the death
penalty (See Table 6) and whether or not the prisoner was
judged competent for execution was nonsignificant, X 2 (3) =
4.20 £ - .23.

This indicates that within the organic brain

syndrome disorder, the psychologists' attitude toward the
death penalty was unrelated to the psychologists' judgement
as to whether or not the inmate was competent for execution.
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Table 6
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions:

As Related to Organic Brain Syndrome

Judgement for
Execution
Competent

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose
16(80%)

17(63%)

6(46%)

Strongly
Oppose
10(50%)

Incompetent

4(20%)

10(37%)

7(54%)

7(41%)

Total

20

27

13

17

Within the prior history of adjustment disorder
(normal), Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' view of
the death penalty (See Table 7) and whether or not the
prisoner was competent for execution was nonsignificant, X 2
(3) = 4.02, £ = .25.

This indicates that within the

adjustment disorder condition, the death penalty attitude of
the psychologists was unrelated to whether or not the
psychologist determined the inmate competent for execution.
Table 7
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions:

As Related to Adjustment Disorder

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Strongly
Oppose

Competent

8(67%)

27(84%)

12(80%)

Incompetent

4(33%)

5(16%)

3(20%)

7(39%)

Total

12

15

18

32

"11 '661% >
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Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency Judgement:
As Related to Crime Condition
Four separate crime scenarios described the death row
inmate's crime as occurring under one of our conditions.
These conditions were:

impulsive, premediated, heinous, or

non-heinous.
Four 4x2 Chi-square analyses were performed, one for
each crime condition to determine if the psychologists' view
of the death penalty (strongly favor, somewhat favor,
somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose) was related to whether
or not they assessed the inmate as competent for execution.
Within the impulsive crime condition (See Table 8),
Chi-square analysis of death penalty attitude and competency
judgement was nonsignificant, X 2 (3) = .44, £ = .93.

This

indicates that for the impulsive crime, the psychologists'
attitude pertaining to the death penalty and his
determination as to the competency of the prisoner to be
executed was unrelated.
Table 8
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions:

As Pv.elated to Impulsive Crime

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Competent

27(71%)

36(67%)

16(67%)

23(642)

Incompetent

11(29%)

18(33%)

8(33%)

13(36%)

54

24

Total

38

Strongly
Oppose

36

59
Within the premediated crime condition (See Table 9),
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' death penalty
attitude and competency judgement was significant, X 2 (3) =
10.72, £ < .01.

This indicates that in the case of

premeditated crime, the psychologists' assessment of whether
or not the prisoner was competent for execution was affected
by the psychologists' attitude toward the death penalty.
The psychologists who rated themselves as strongly in favor
or somewhat in favor of the death penalty were more likely
to assess the prisoner as competent rather than incompetent
for execution than were the psychologists who were somewhat
opposed or strongly opposed to the death penalty.
Table 9

Decisions:

As Related to Premeditated Crime

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Competent

Strongly
Oppose

55(76%)

22(54%)

20(54%)

Incompetent

3(16%)

14(24%)

19(46%)

17(46%)

Total

19

59

41

37

Within the heinous crime condition (See Table 10), Chisquare analysis of the psychologists' attitude pertaining to
the death penalty and their assessment as to whether or not
the inmate was competent for execution was significant, X 2
(3) = 7.73, £ < .05.

This indicates that when the prisoner
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Table 10
Effect of Death Penalty Attitude on Competency for Execution
Decisions:

As Related to Heinous Crime

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Competent

29(81%)

37(71%)

22(58%)

18(53%)

7(19%)

15(29%)

16(42%)

16(47%)
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38

34

Incompetent
Total

36

Strongly
Oppose

had committed a heinous crime, the attitude of the
psychologists toward the death penalty affected their
assessment of the inmate’s competency to be executed.

The

psychologists who rated themselves as strongly in favor or
somewhat in favor of the death penalty were more likely to
judge the inmate as competent rather than incompetent
compared to the psychologists who rated themselves as
somewhat or strongly opposed to the death penalty.
Within the non-heinous crime condition (See Table 11),
Table 11

Decisions:

As Related to Non-heinous Crime

Judgement for
Execution

Death Penalty Attitude
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Favor
Favor
Oppose

Competent

14(67%)

44(72%)

16(59%)

18(53%)

7(33%)

17(28%)

11(41%)

14(36%)

61

27

39

Incompetent
Total

21

Strongly
Oppose

61
Chi-square analysis of the psychologists' attitude regarding
the death penalty and whether or not the prisoner was
competent for execution was nonsignificant, X 2 (3) = 1.60, £
= .65.

This indicates that when the inmate's crime was non-

heinous, the attitude of the psychologist pertaining to the
death penalty did not affect the psychologists' assessment
of whether or not the inmate was competent for execution.
Effect of Death-Qualification on Competency Judgements
A total of 309 psychologists responded to the
Witherspoon criterion variable regarding their willingness
or unwillingness to impose the death penalty under any
circumstances and rated the inmate's competency for
execution.

Of this number, 249 (80%) psychologists

indicated that they were willing to consider imposing the
death penalty, and were therefore classified as
death-qualified according to current legal standards.

Sixty

psychologists (20%) indicated that they would be unwilling
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, and
were therefore classified as excludable under current legal
standards.
Among the 249 death-qualified psychologists, 173
respondents (69%) indicated that they believed the death row
inmate was competent for execution.

Seventy-six death-

qualified psychologists (31%) indicated that they believed
the prisoner was incompetent for execution.

62
Among the 60 excludable psychologists, 33 respondents
(55%) indicated that they believed the death row inmate was
competent for execution, whereas 27 (45%) of the excludable
psychologists believed that 'he inmate was incompetent for
execution.
Chi-square analysis of death-qualification (willingness
to impose the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to
impose the death penalty) and whether or not the inmate was
found competent or incompetent for execution was
significant, X 2 (1) = 4.56, £ < 4.56, £ < .03 (see Table
12).

This indicates that death-qualification (i.e., the

willingness to impose the death penalty under some
circumstances) was related to the psychologists' decision as
to competency of the inmate.

Specifically, within the group

of death-qualified psychologists, the prisoner was more
likely to be assessed as competent rather than incompetent
for execution when compared to the competency ratings in the
group of excludable psychologists, i.e., those psychologists
who would be unwilling to impose the death penalty under any
circumstances.
Effect of Death-Qualification on Competency Judgement:

As

Related to Prior Psychopathology
Four 2x2 Chi-squares, one for each of the four
histories of psychopathology (paranoid schizophrenia,
antisocial personality disorder, organic brain syndrome, and
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Table 12
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions

Judgement for
Execution

Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable
Death
Qualified

Competent

33(55%)

73(69%)

Incompetent

27(45%)

76(31%)

Total

60

249

adjustment disorder) were conducted to determine if the
psychologists’ willingness (death-qualified) or
unwillingness (excludable) to impose the death penalty was
related to whether or not the psychologists assessed the
inmate as competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the prior history of paranoid schizophrenia, 16
excludable psychologists responded.

Of this number, 6 (38%)

rated the prisoner as competent for execution while 10 (62%)
rated him incompetent.
psychologists responded.

A total of 60 death-qualified
Of this number, 30 (50%) rated the

prisoner as competent for execution and 30 (50%) rated him
incompetent for execution (see Table 13).

Chi-square

analysis of the psychologists' willingness to impose the
death penalty and whether or not the prisoner was assessed
as competent or incompetent for execution was
nonsignificant, X 2 (1) = .79, £ = .37.

This indicates that

when the prisoner was previously diagnosed as paranoid
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Table 13
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

Judgement for
Execution

As Related to Paranoid Schizophrenia
Witherspoon Criteria
Death
Excludable
Qualified

Competent

6(37%)

30(50%)

Incompetent

10(63%)

30(50%)

Total

16

60

schizophrenic, the psychologists' classification as
excludable or death-qualified was not related to their
assessment of competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the prior history of antisocial personality
disorder, 15 excludable psychologists indicated their
decisions.

Of this number, 9 (60%) rated the inmate as

competent for execution whereas 6 (40%) rated him
incompetent.

A total of 63 death-qualified psychologists

indicated their decisions.

Of this number, 53 (84%) rated

the prisoner as competent for execution while 10 (16%) rated
him incompetent (see Table 14).

Chi-square analysis of

death-qualified or excludable and ratings of competent or
incompetent was significant, X 2 (1) = 4.32, £ < .03.

This

indicates that when the prisoner was previously diagnosed as
antisocial personality disorder, whether or not the
psychologist was death-qualified (willing to impose the
death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to impose the death
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penalty) was related to the psychologists' determination of
Table 14
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on

Disorder

Judgement for
Execution

Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable
Death
Qualified

Competent

9'<W)

53(84%)

Incompetent

6(40%)

10(16%)

Total

15

63

whether or not the prisoner was competent or incompetent for
execu ;ion.

The death-qualified psychologists were more

likely than the excludable psychologists to assess the
inmate with a previous diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder as competent rather than incompetent for execution.
Within the organic brain syndrome condition, a total of
9 excludable psychologists responded.

Of this number, 4

(44%) rated the inmate as competent for execution and 5
(56%) rated him incompetent.
psychologists responded.

Sixty-eight death-qualified

Of this number, 45 (66%) rated the

inmate as competent for execution while 23 (34%) rated him
incompetent (see Table 15).

Chi-square analysis of death-

qualified or excludable and assessment of competency was
nonsignificant, X 2 (1) = 1.62, £ = .20.

This indicates that

when the prisoner was previously diagnosed as organic brain
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Table 15
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

As Related to Organic Brain Syndrome
"ypoon Criteria
Excluc? Kf '
Death
Qualified

Judgement for
Execution
Competent

VU^l) ------------ S T T W l --------

Incompetent

5(56%)

23(34%)

Total

9
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syndrome, the classification of death-qualified (willing to
impose the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to impose
the death penalty) was unrelated to the competency judgement
for execution.
Within the adjustment disorder condition, there were 20
excludable psychologists.

Of this number, 14 (70%) rated

the inmate as competent for execution and 6 (30%) rated him
incompetent.

There were 57 death-qualified psychologists.

Of this number, 44 (77%) rated the prisoner as competent for
execution as opposed to 13 (23%) who rated him incompetent
(see Table 16).

Chi-square analysis of death-qualified or

excludable was nonsignificant, X 2 (1) = .41, £ = .52.

This

indicates that when the prisoner was previously diagnosed
with adjustment disorder, the classification of
death-qualified (willing to impose the death penalty) or
excludable (unwilling to impose the death penalty) was
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unrelated to whether or not the inmate was judged as
competent or incompetent for execution.
Table 16
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

As Related to Adjustment Disorder
Witherspoon Criteria
Death
Excludable
Qualified

Judgement for
Execution
Competent
Incompetent
Total

14(70%)

wan)

6(30%)

13(23%)

20

57

Effect of Death-qualification on Competency Judgement:

As

Related to Crime Condition
Four 2x2 Chi-squares, one for each crime condition
(impulsive, premeditated, heinous and non-heinous) were
conducted to determine if the willingness (death-qualified)
or unwillingness (excludable) of the psychologists to impose
the death penalty was related to the psychologists
assessment of whether or not the inmate was competent or
incompetent for execution.
Within the impulsive crime condition, 27 excludable
psychologists responded.

Of this number, 17 (63%) rated the

inmate as competent and 10 (37%) rated him as incompetent
for execution.

A total of 125 psychologists who were death-

qualified responded.

Of this number, 85 (68%) rated the

prisoner as competent and 40 (32%) rated him incompetent
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(see Table 17).

Chi-square analysis of death-qualified or

excludable and whether or not the inmate was rated as
competent or incompetent was ronsignificant, X 2 (1) = .07, £
= .77.

This indicate that when the inmate had committed an

Table 17
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

As Related to Impulsive C: me
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable
heath
Qualified

Judgement for
Execution
Competent

17(63%)

85(68%)

Incompetent

10(37%)

40(32%)

Total

27

125

impulsive crime, whether or not the psychologist was deathqualified (willing to impose the death penalty) or
excludable (unwilling to impose the death penalty) was
unrelated to whether or not the inmate was rated as
competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the premeditated crime condition, 33 excludable
subjects responded.

Of this number, 16 (48%) rated the

inmate as competent for execution while 17 (52%) rated him
incompetent.
responded.

A total of 123 death-qualified subjects
Of this number, 87 (71%) assessed the inmate as

competent for execution and 36 (29%) assessed him as
incompetent for execution (see Table 18).

Chi-square

analysis of death-qualified or excludable and competency
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Table 18
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

Judgement for
Execution

As Related to Premeditated Crime
Witherspoon Criteria
Death
Excludable
Qualified

Competent

16(482)

87(712)

Incompetent

17(52%)

36(29%)

Total

33

123

assessment of the inmate was significant, X 2 (1) = 5.74, £
< .01.

This indicates that whether or not the psychologist

was death-qualified (willing to impose the death penalty) or
excludable (unwilling to impose the death penalty) was
related to whether or not the inmate was assessed as
competent or incompetent for execution.

In the case of

premeditation in crime, those psychologists who were willing
to impose the death penalty (death-qualified) were more
likely than those psychologists who were unwilling to impose
the death penalty (excludable) to assess the prisoner as
competent rather than incompetent for execution.
Within the heinous crime condition, there were a total
of 29 excludable psychologists.

Of this number, 15 (52%)

rated the inmate as competent for execution while 14 (48%)
rated him incompetent.

A total of 131 death-qualified

psychologists were in this condition.

Of this number, 91

(69%) respondents rated the prisoner as competent and 40
(31%) respondents rated him incompetent (see Table 19).
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Table 19
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

As Related to Heinous Crime
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable
Death
Qualified

Judgement for
Execution
Competent

15(52%)

91(69%T“

Incompetent

14(48%)

40(31%)

Total

29

131

Chi-square analysis of death-qualified or excludable and
competent or incompetent was marginally nonsignificant, X 2
(1) = 3.34, £ =

.06.

This indicates that when the capital

crime was heinous, the willingness (death-qualified) or
unwillingness (excludable) of the psychologist to impose the
death penalty was unrelated to whether or not the inmate was
assessed as competent or incompetent for execution.
Within the non-heinous crime condition, of the 31
excludable psychologists, 18 (58%) rated the prisoner as
competent for execution and 13 (42%) rated him incompetent.
Of the 117 death-qualified psychologists, 81 (69%) rated the
prisoner competent and 36 (31%) rated him incompetent (see
Table 20).

Chi-square analysis was nonsignificant, X 2 (1) =

.92, £ = .33.

This indicates that in the non-heinous crime

condition, willingness to impose the death penalty (deathqualified) or the unwillingness to impose the death penalty
(excludable) was unrelated to whether or not the prisoner
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was assessed as competent or incompetent for execution.
Table 20
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty on
Competency Decisions:

As Related to Non-heinous Crime
Witherspoon Criteria
Excludable
Death
Qualified

Judgement for
Execution
Competent

18(58%)

81(69%)

Incompetent

13(42%)

36(31%)

Total

31

117

Effect of Type of Disorder on Competency Judgement
One 4 (type of disorder) x 2 (competent or incompetent).
Chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if the
prisoner's previous type of psychopathology was related to
whether or not the psychologists rated the prisoner as
competent or incompetent for execution

independent of

death-qualified or excludable classification.

A

relationship emerged between these variables (see Table 21).
Table 21
Effect of Type of Disorder on Competency Decision
_
Judgement
for
Execution

“
Paranoid
Schizophrenia

S H I of Disorder
Antisocial
Organic
Personality Brain
Disorder
Syndrome

Adjustment
Disorder

Competent

36(47%)

62(79%)

50(64%)

58775%)

Incompetent

40(53%)

16(21%)

28(36%)

19(25%)

Total

76

78

78

77
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Mien the prisoner was described as previously diagnosed
as paranoid schizophrenia, 36 (47%) of the respondents rated
him as competent for execution and 40 (53%) rated him
incompetent.

In contrast, when the prisoner was previously

diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder, organic brain
syndrome, or adjustment disorder, he was rated as competent
rather than incompetent more often.

Specifically, when

diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder, 62 (79%) of
the psychologists rated him as competent compared to 16 (21%)
who rated him as incompetent.

In the case or organic brain

syndrome, 50 (64%) of the psychologists rated him competent
while 28 (36%) rated him incompetent.

When the previous

diagnosis was adjustment disorder, 58 (75%) of the
psychologists rated the inmate competent for execution and
19 (25%) rated him incompetent.

Chi-square analysis of the

prisoners type of prior psychopathology and the
psychologist's judgement regarding the prisoner's competency
to be executed was significant, X 2 (3) = 21.33, £ < .001.
This indicate that the psychologist's judgement was affected
by the prisoner's previous clinical condition.

Paranoid

schizophrenia was the only disorder that was more often
rated not competent rather than competent for execution.
Main Effects of Psychopathology:

On Impact of Disorder

During Crime Commission
A One-Way Analysis of Variance revealed that the
prisoner's prior type of disorder significantly affected the
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amount of impact the psychologists believed the disorder had
on the commission of the crime [ F (3, 315) = 10.56, £ <
.05],

Cell means and standard deviations for the dependent

variables impact of clinical condition, legal
responsibility, and malingering are presented in Table 22.
Neuman-Keuls' procedure indicated that the prisoner
diagnosed an adjustment disorder with anxious mood was rated
as significantly less affected (p < .05) by his clinical
condition during the commission of the crime than when the
diagnosis was paranoid schizophrenia (3.17 vs. 4.61),
organic brain syndrome (3.17 vs. 4.41), or antisocial
personality disorder (3.17 vs. 4.28).
On Legal Responsibility for the Crime
Results of a One-Way Analysis of Variance also revealed
a main effect of type of psychopathology on how legally
responsible for his crime the inmate was believed to be [ F
(3, 314) = 18.13, £ < .001],

Neuman-Keuls analysis revealed

that the psychologists rated the prisoner with the previous
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia as significantly less
legally responsible (£ < .001) for committing the capital
offense than they rated the prisoner diagnosed as adjustment
disorder (4.88 vs. 6.26).

The prisoner with paranoid

schizophrenia was also rated as significantly less legally
responsible for the crime (£ < .001) than the prisoner with
antisocial personality disorder (4.88 vs. 6.30).

The

prisoner diagnosed as organic brain syndrome was rated by
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Table 22
ANOVA Main Effects of Psychopathology

o

Impact of Clinical Condition
Type of
Mean (Std. Dev.)
df
Disorder__________________Scores_______ (3,315)
Paranoid
Schizophrenic
4.61 (1.66)
Antisocial
Personality Disorder 4.18 (1.98)
Organic Brain
Syndrome
4.41 (1.62)
Adjustment Disorder
3.17 (1.70)

Legal Responsibility
Type of
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Disorder
Scores
Paranoid
Schizophrenic
4.88 (1.91)
Antisocial
Personality Disorder 6.30 (1.14)
Organic Brain
Syndrome
5.29 (1.59)
Adjustment Disorder
6.26 (1.15)

df
(3,314)

Q
Malingering Likelihood
Type of
Mean (Std. Dev.)
df
Disorder
______ Scores_______ (3,311)
Paranoid
Schizophrenic
3.24 (1.59)
Antisocial
Personality Disorder 4.80 (1.73)
Organic Brain
Syndrome
3.50 (1.48)
Adjustment Disorder
4.41 (1.67)

F
P
10.56, .001

F
18.13

P
.001

F
16.11

P
.001

aA Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "l" indicating
"Had No Impact" and "7" indicating "Had Extreme Impact".
JA Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating
"Not at All Responsible" and "7" indicating "Completely
Responsible".
CA Score was obtained between "1” and ”7"; "1" indicating
If
"Not at All Likely" and "7" indicating "Extremely Likely
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the psychologists as significantly less legally responsible
for his crime (£ < .001) than the prisoner with adjustment
disorder (5.29 vs. 6.26) and those previously affected with
organic brain syndrome were also rated as less legally
responsible for their actions during the crime (£ < .001) as
those previously affected with antisocial personality
disorder (5.29 vs. 6.30).

No other significant differences

between the four psychopathologies were demonstrated.
Likelihood of Malingering on Death Row
A main effect of type of disorder emerged by One-Way
Analysis of Variance on the dependent variable of likelihood
that the prisoner's current behavior on death row was
malingering [ F (3, 311) = 16.11, £ < .001].

Neuman-Keuls

analysis demonstrated that the psychologists rated the
prisoner previously diagnosed as antisocial personality
disorder significantly more likely to be malingering on
death row (£ < .001) than the prisoner formerly diagnosed as
paranoid schizophrenic (A.80 vs. 3.2A).

The subjects also

believed that the inmate formerly diagnosed as adjustment
disorder was significantly more likely to be malingering on
death row (£ < .001) than was the paranoid schizophrenic
(A.A1 vs. 3.2A).

The psychologists rated the prisoner

previously diagnosed as antisocial personality disorder as
Mficantly morr 1-<kely to be malingering (£ < .001) than
the prisoner formerly diagnosed as organic brain syndrome
(A.80 vs. 3.50) and also believed that the prisoner
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diagnosed as adjustment disorder was significantly more
likely to be malingering on death row (£ < .001) than was
the prisoner formerly diagnosed as organic brain syndrome
(A.41 vs. 3.50).

No other significant differences in

likelihood of malingering occurred between any of the four
groups.
Main Effects of Type of Crime
Six One-Way Analyses of Variance was conducted to
investigate the possible effects of type of crime (heinous/
non-heinous; impulsive/premeditated) on the dependent
variables of a) impact of the clinical condition on the
commission of the crime, b) legal responsibility of the
inmate for the crime, and c) likelihood that the defendant
was malingering on death row.
Results indicated that a main effect of heinous crime
was evident on the dependent variable of impact the clinical
condition of the inmate had on the inmate's behavior during
the crime [ F (1, 315) = 4.85, £ < .02].

The analysis

revealed that the prisoners who had committed a heinous
crime were rated by the psychologists as significantly more
affected by their clinical condition (paranoid
schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, organic
brain syndrome, or adjustment disorder) than those prisoners
who had committed a non-hemous crime.
An additional One-Way Analysis of Variance demonstrated
that the crime committed under the premeditated crime
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condition was rated as significantly more heinous [ F (1,
321) = A. 15, £ < .04] by the respondents than was the crime
committed under the impulsive crime condition.
To assess the validity of the independent variables:
heinous crime, impulsive crime, and premeditated crime,
One-Way Analysis of Variance were conducted on the dependent
measures of:

a) perceived heinousness of the crime,

b) impulsivity rating of the crime, and c) degree of
premeditation of the crime.

Results revealed that the crime

committed under the heinous crime condition was perceived as
significantly more heinous than was the crime committed
under the non-heinous crime condition ( F (1, 321) = 56.20,
£ < .001].

The crime committed under the impulsive crime

condition was rated as significantly more impulsive than the
crime committed under the premeditated crime condition [ F
(1, 315) = 184.74, £ < .001], and the crime committed under
the premeditated crime condition was rated as significantly
more premeditated than was the crime committed under the
impulsive crime condition ( F (1, 315) = 190,67, p < .001],
No other significant effects were obtained for type of
crime.
Main Effects of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty
Three One-Way Analyses of Variance were conducted to
investigate the possible effects of death-qualified (willing
to impose the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to
impose the death penalty) on the dependent measures of
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a) impact of the disorder on the commission of the crime,
b) legal responsibility for the crime, and c) likelihood of
malingering.

No significant differences were obtained

between the two groups of death-qualified or excludable
psychologists in their ratings of the three dependent
measures.

Additional One-Way Analyses of Variance were

conducted to determine if differences were apparent between
the death-qualified and excludable psychologists in their
ratings of:

a) how heinous they perceived the crime to be,

b) how premeditated they believed the crime was, and c) how
impulsive they believed the crime had been.
differences were obtained.

No significant

The death-qualified and

excludable psychologists demonstrated statistically
equivalent mean scores on ratings of heinousne^s,
premeditation, and impulsivity linger every crime condition.
Main Effects of Competency:

On Impact of the Disorder

during Crime Commission
One-Way Analysis of Variance revealed that the
psychologists who assessed the inmate as competent for
execution rated the inmate as significantly less affected by
his previous clinical diagnosis than did the psychologists
who assessed the inmate as incompetent for execution f F (1,

3 0 6 ) = 2 6 . 0 7 , £ < . 0 0 1 ].
On Legal Responsibility for the Crime
One-Way Analyses of Variance demonstrated that the
psychologists who assessed the inmate as competent for
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execution rated the prisoner as significantly more legally
responsible for his crime than the psychologists who
assessed the inmate as incompetent for execution
[ F (1, 306) = 67.09, p < .001.
On Likelihood of Malingering Behavior on Death Row
It was also demonstrated by One-Way Analyses of
Variance that the psychologists who assessed the inmate as
competent for execution rated the inmate as significantly
more likely to be malingering on death row than did the
psychologists who assessed the inmate as incompetent for
execution [ F (1, 303) = 142.71, £ < .001.

Cell means and

standard deviations for the three dependent measures of
impact of the disorder on crime, legal responsibility for
crime, and likelihood of malingering are illustrated in
Table 23.
Each subject was presented with four different sources
of information pertaining to the death-row inmate.
sources were:

These

a) social history, b) crime description,

c) current behavior on death-row, and d) test scores (WAIS-R
and MMPI-1).

The psychologists rated each source of

information according to how much impact it had upon their
judgement of the inmate's competency to be executed.
mean ratinp

The

~>r the psychologists who judged the inmate to

be competent for execution and those who judged him to be
incompetent for execution are presented in Table 24.
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Table 23
ANOVA Main Effects of Competency

Impact of Clinical Condition3
Judgement for
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Execution
Scores
Competent
4.75 (1.78)

df
(1,306)

F
26.07

P
.001

df
(1,306)

F
26.07

P
.001

Malingering Likelihood0
Judgement for
Mean (Std. Dev.)
df
Execution
Scores
(1,306)
Competent
4.69 (1.58)

F
26.07

P
.001

Incompetent

4.83 (1.70)

Legal Responsibility
Judgement for
Mean (Std. Dev.)
Execution
Scores
Competent
6.16 (1.17)
Incompetent

Incompetent

4.71 (1.91)

2.59 (1.10)

A Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating
No Impact" and "7" indicating "Had Extreme Impact".
A Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating
"Not at All Responsible" and "7" indicating "Completely
Responsible".
A Score was obtained between "1" and "7"; "1" indicating
"Not at All Likely" and "7" indicating "Extremely Likely".

l "Had

On Importance of Social History
The subjects were requested to rate how important the
information contained in the social history of the inmate
was in formulating their assessment as to whether or not the
inmate was competent or incompetent for execution.

All

information included in the social history was held constant

81
between groups except for the previous diagnoses of the
inmate, which was varied between paranoid schizophrenic,
antisocial personality disorder, organic brain syndrome, and
adjustment disorder with anxious mood.
Table 24
Cell Means and Standard Deviations Denoting the Importance
of Information Sources on Formulating Competency Decision
Source of Information
Social3
History

Crime3
Description

Current3
Behavior

Test3
Scores

Judgement for
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Execution
(Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.)
Competent

5.05
(1.64)

5.26
(1.89)

4.74
(1.74)

5.46
(1.54)

Incompetent

4.66
(2.19)

4.05
(2.10)

6.04
(1.29)

4.78
(1.70)

aA Score was obtained between "1" and "7" with "l” indicating
"Not at All Important","?" indicating "Extremely Important."
One-Way Analyses of Variance indicated that there were
no significant differences between the degree of importance
attributed to information contained in the social history
among the psychologists who rated the inmate competent and
the psychologists who rated him incompetent.
On Importance of Crime Description
All subjects were asked to rate how important they
believed the information contained in the crime description
was in the formulation of their decision as to whether or
not the prisoner was competent for execution.
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A One-Way Analyses of Variance revealed that the
psychologists who assessed the inmate competent for
execution rated the crime description significantly more
important in formulating their decision than did the
psychologists who rated the inmate incompetent for execution
[ F (1, 306) = 25.64, £ < .001].
On Importance of Current Behavior on Death Row
The psychologists were requested to rate how important
the inmate's current behavior on death row was in
formulating their decision regarding the inmate's competency
for execution.
A One-Way Analyses of Variance demonstrated that the
psychologists who rated the inmate competent for execution
attributed significantly less importance to the behavior the
inmate was currently demonstrating on death row than did the
psychologists who rated the inmate incompetent for execution
( F (1, 309) = 45.28 £ < .001].
On Importance of Test Scores
The subjects were asked to rate how important the
inmate's psychological test scores (MMPI, WAIS-R) were in
formulating their decision as to the competency of the
prisoner to be executed.
One-Way Analysis of Variance revealed that the
psychologists who assessed the inmate competent for
execution rated the test scores as significantly more
important in their decision than did the psychologist who
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determined that the inmate was incompetent for execution ( F
(1, 305) = 12.41, £ < .001].
The mean impact ratings of the social history, crime
description, current behavior on death-row, and test scores
were compared using standard £-tests for the two groups of
psychologists, i.e., the group of psychologists who assessed
the inmate as competent for execution and the group that
assessed the inmate as incompetent for execution.

All

significant effects were observed with a £ < .05.

Within

the group who judged the inmate to be competent, the
psychologists rated the test scores as significantly more
important to the formulation of their competency decision
than the inmate's current behavior on death-row (5.46 vs.
4.74), t (205) = -4.46.

They also rated the crime

description was significantly more important to the issue of
competency than the inmate's current death-row behavior
(5.26 vs. 4.74), £ (205) = 2.92.

The inmate’s test scores

were rated by this group as significantly more important
than the inmate's social history for the determination of
competency (5.46 vs. 5.05) t (205) = -2.. 60.

No other

significant differences in the mean importance ratings for
the four sources of information were determined within the
group of subjects that judged the inmate to be competent for
execution.
Within the group of subjects who assessed the inmate
incompetent to be executed, the psychologists endorsed the
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inmate's current behavior on death-row as significantly more
important to their determination of incompetency than the
inmate's test scores (6.04 vs. 4.78), t_ (99) = 5.96.

They

further endorsed the current death-row behavior as
significantly more important to their decision than the
inmate's social history (6.04 vs. 4.66), t (99) = -5.47; or
the description of the crime (6.04 vs. 4.05) t_ (99) = -8.11.
The inmate's test scores were rated significantly more
important to the competency decision than the crime
description (4.78 vs. 4.05), t (99) = -2.68, and the
inmate's social history was rated as significantly more
important than the crime description as well (4.66 vs.
4.05), t: = 1,98.

No other significant differences were

illustrated in the mean impact ratings of the sources of
information within the group of psychologists who judged the
inmate to be incompetent for execution.
Effect of Willingness to Impose the Death Penalty
Four One-Way Analyses of Variance were conducted to
investigate the possible relationships between whether or
not the psychologist was death-qualified (willing to impose
the death penalty) or excludable (unwilling to impose the
death penalty) on the dependent measures of a) importance
of social history, b) importance of crime description,
c) importance of current behavior on death row, and
d) importance of test scores.
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Results indicated that the death-qualified
psychologists rated the social history significantly more
important to their decision regarding competency of the
inmate than did the excludable psychologists [ F (1, 312) =
4.74, £ < .03].

There were no significant differences

between the ratings of the death-qualified or excludable
psychologists on the importance they attributed to the crime
description, current behavior on death row, or inmate’s test
scores (See Table 25).
The mean impact ratings of the social history, crime
description, current behavior on death-row, and test scores
were compared using standard t-tests for the two groups of
psychologists, i.e., the group of psychologists who were
death-qualified and the group that was excludable.
significant effects were observed with a £ < .05.

All
Within

the group of death-qualified psychologists, the subjects
rated the inmate's test scores significantly more important
in the formulation of their competency for execution
decision than the crime description (5.30 vs. 4.92), t (251)
= -2.34.

The death-qualified psychologists endorsed the

inmate’s current death-row behavior, social history, and
crime description as having statistically equivalent value
to their determination of whether or not the inmate was
competent to be executed.
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Table 25
Cell Means and Standard Deviations Denoting the Importance
of Information Sources Between Death-Qualified and
Excludable Subjects
Source of Information
Social3
History
Witherspoon
Criteria
Death
Qualified
Excludable

Crimea
Description

Current3
Behavior

Test3
Scores

Mean
(Std.Dev.)

Mean
(Std.Dev.)

5.03
(1.75)

4.92
(2.04)

5.16
(1.69)

5.30
(1.54)

4.46
(2.12)

4.57
(2.04)

5.38
(1.81)

5.00
(1.89)

Mean
Mean
(Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.

A Score was obtained between "1" and "7" with "1"
indicating "Not at All Important" and "7" indicating
"Extremely Important."
Within the group of excludable psychologists, the
current death-row behavior of the inmate was rated as
significantly more important to their competency assessment
than either the crime description (5.38 vs. 4.57), t: (59) =
-2.33 or the inmate's social history (5.38 vs. 4.46), t_ (59)
= -2.57.

No other significant differences in the mean

impact ratings of the four measures were observed within the
group of excludable psychologists.

Table 26 presents the

rank-ordered mean value of the four sources of information
(social history, crime description, current behavior, and
test scores) as endorsed by the four groups of subjects
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(determined inmate competent, determined inmate incompetent,
death-qualified, and excludable).
Table 26
Rank-ordered Mean Value of the Information Sources as
Endorsed by Psychologists Who Determined the Inmate
Competent or Incompetent and Who Were Death-Qualified or
Excludable

Determined
Competent

Determined
Incompetent

Witherspoon
Death-Qualified

Witherspoon
Excludable

Test
Scores
(5.46)

Current
Behavior
(6.04)

Test
Scores
(5.30)

Current
Behavior
(5.38)

Crime
Description
(5.26)

Test
Scores
(4.78)

Current
Behavior
(5.16)

Test
Scores
(5.00)

Social
History
(5.05)

Social
History
(4.66)

Social
History
(5.03)

Crime
Description
(4.57)

Current
Behavior
(4.74)

Crime
Description
(4.05)

Crime
Description
(4.92)

Social
History
(4.46)

Effect of Type of Disorder
Four One-Way Analyses of Variance were conducted to
determine the effects of the type of disorder on the
dependent variables of a) importance of social history,
b) importance of crime description, c) importance of current
behavior on death row, and d) importance of test scores.
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A main effect of type of disorder was found on the
dependent measure of crime description ( F (3, 312) = 2.87,
£ < .03].

Neuman-Keuls analysis indicated that when the

prisoner was described as previously affected by antisocial
personality disorder the psychologists rated the crime
description as significantly more important to their
determination of competency to be executed (£ < .03)
compared to when the prisoner was described as previously
affected by paranoid schizophrenia (5.27 vs. 4.34).
other significant effects of psychopathology were
demonstrated.

No

DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to investigate the
relationship between death penalty attitudes, deathqualification, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances
on the competency for execution decisions made by forensic
psychologists.

The classification of death-qualified or

excludable status among subjects was determined by the
criteria developed by Fitzgerald and Ellsworth in 1984 and
is the criteria that meets current legal standards for the
selection of death-qualified jurors to serve on capital
juries.

Those who would consider imposing the death penalty

under some circumstances are classified as death-qualified
and eligible to serve as jurors in capital offenses.

Those

who are unwilling to consider imposing the death penalty
under any circumstances are classified as excludable and are
ineligible for jury duty in capital trials.
Death-Qualified Versus Excludable Psychologists
The present study found that 258 of the 322 responding
psychologists (80%) indicated that they would be willing to
impose the death penalty, and would therefore be considered
death-qualified under current legal standards.

Sixty

psychologists (20%) indicated that they would be unwilling
to impose the death penalty under any circumstances and
would therefore be classified as excludable.
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The percentage
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of psychologists in the present study found to be deathqualified in slightly lower than the percentages commonly
reported in the jury literature by Fitzgerald and Ellsworth
(1984).

These investigators have reported a death-qualified

rate of 83% when the population examined was adult men and
women eligible for jury selection.

In contrast, the

percentage of psychologists in the present study who can be
classified as excludable is somewhat higher than the 17%
Fitzgerald and Ellsworth report.

These small discrepancies

may be attributable to the characteristics of the two
populations sampled.

It could be argued that male forensic

psychologists comprise a more homogeneous group than the
male and female sample of adults eligible for jury selection
in terms of sex, education level, and occupation.

One might

expect the number of excludable psychologists to be somewhat
higher than the 20% reported in the present study, based on
the robust findings that increasing levels of education tend
to attenuate belief in the death penalty (Cowan, Thompson, &
Ellsworth, 1984; Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, & Thompson, 1984;
Ellsworth & Ross, 1982).

Three possible explanations could

be considered for the relatively large differences between
the number of death-qualified and excludable psychologists.
The first lies in the chosen speciality of forensic
psychology.

The criminal justice system in the United

States, based on English common law, is an adversarial one.
Exhibits, evidence, and witnesses are introduced by one side
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or the other with the sole purpose of convincing the
fact-finder that a particular side's viewpoint is the
truthful one (Wrightsman, 1991).

Jurors have to choose

between two versions of the truth, both of which are
probably inaccurate to some degree.

Sheppard and Vidmar

(1980) have claimed that lawyers with the adversarial
orientation produce biased accounts of events and facts
among witnesses.

Other critics of the adversarial model

have contended that it promotes a competitive atmosphere
that often distorts the truth about a dispute (Lind, 1982).
Psychology, in contrast, is empirical in its orientation.
Graduate training in the spirit of the scientists/
practitioner model advocates objectivity and impartiality
when evaluating evidence.

Clinically, the role of the

psychologist is to understand and assist individuals to
bring about therapeutic change by means of a supportive,
helping relationship.

Psychologists who find themselves in

the midst of an adversarial arena, may then, experience
moral dilemmas as they attempt to adhere to the profession's
code of ethical conduct while being perceived by the courts
as an advocate, rather than an unbiased scientist
(Wrightsman, 1991).

It is possible that psychologists who

seek careers within such a system may tend to possess
personal characteristics that are inherently different from
those psychologists who decline participation in forensicrelated services.

The field may attract or reward
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individuals who are more comfortable with controversy and
dispute associated with adversarial justice and ill-defined
concepts such as "competency" and "insanity."

Such

individuals may be less likely to experience cognitive
dissonance (e.g., the internal conflict associated with
rendering an absolute judgment based on evidence that is
inaccurate, imprecise, and often irrelevant) when placed in
the adversarial arena of the courtroom or death-row.
Secondly, the present socio-political climate tends to
foster a "get tough" policy in regard to the suppression of
crime in the United States.

"Law and order" was the

rallying cry during the presidential campaign of 1968.

The

election of Richard Nixon in that year symbolized a shift in
the sympathies of the general population and witnessed the
Supreme Court rendering decisions aimed at redressing the
imbalance between suspects’ rights and society's rights
(Wrightman, 1991).

On one level, the reason the Supreme

Court has moved toward restricting the rights of the accused
over the last 20 years is that its newer members reflect the
conservative political values of those who chose them
(Nixon, Ford, Reagan, & Bush), yet shifts in the concerns of
individual voters and society at large were responsible for
the presidential elections and subsequent appointments
(Wrightman, 1991).

The public outcry against crime has

continued to gain momentum over the last two decades and is
reflected by the current administration's recent proposal of
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a bill to Congress that would expand the death penalty to 30
more categories of crime.

thus, there may be some sense of

social responsibility, or concern for the protection of
society at large that prompts forensic psychologists to
support the death penalty for at least some capital
offenses.

The third possibility would be that a

response-bias existed in the present sample and contributed
to the large number of death-qualified psychologists
reported in this study, i.e., those who were death-qualified
were more inclined to participate as subjects or more
interested in the topic of death penalty attitudes and
competency for execution.

This issue will be discussed in a

later section.
A larger discrepancy between percentages of deathqualified and excludable psychologists occurred between the
present study and a similar investigation by Wytucki (1990).
Wytucki reported that 87% of the forensic psychologists
included in his sample were death-qualified while 13% were
excludable.

Wytucki's popu1ation consisted of both male and

female forensic psychologists, whereas the present study
only sampled male forensic psychologists.

The jury

literature suggests that including females in the sample
could likely increase the number of excludable individuals
and decrease the number of death-qualified.

The most likely

explanation for Wytucki's higher percentage of deathqualified and lower percentage of excludable psychologists
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may lie, therefore, in the differing sampling techniques
rather than characteristics of the samples.

the Wytucki

study was not a random sample from all 50 states.

Only

those psychologists currently residing in the 36 states that
provide for the death penalty were included.
represents 72% of all of the states.

This

In the present study,

77% of the respondents were presently practicing in states
that do authorize the death penalty (See Appendix Q ) , while
23% of the respondents practiced in the remaining 14 states
(Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 1989).

It seems

possible that Wytucki's number of death-qualified
psychologists may have been somewhat inflated by the
nonrandom sample.

This explanation is supported by the

present study that found that the psychologists practicing
in states that provide for the death penalty were clearly
more in favor of the death penalty than psychologists who
practiced in states where no death penalty existed.

Future

investigators, therefore, would be well-advised to consider
this biasing potential when designing similar
investigations.
Death Penalty Attitudes, Death-qualification, and Competency
Decisions
The present study found that the relationship between
death penalty attitudes and a finding of competent for
execution approached, but did not achieve statistical
significance (£ < .06).

It was clearly demonstrated,
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however, that the responding psychologists who did assess
the death-row inmate as competent for execution were
significantly more in favor of the death penalty than were
the psychologists who determined that the inmate was
incompetent for execution (£ < .01).

Death-qualified

psychologists were also found to be significantly more in
favor of the death penalty than were excludable
psychologists.

Perhaps then, it is not so surprising that

death-qualified psychologists in the present study were also
more likely than excludable psychologists to assess the
inmate as competent for execution.

The basis for such a

finding, however, is difficult to ascertain.

Such results

warrant great caution in their interpretation.

A cause-

effect relationship cannot be inferred based upon these data
but a correlational relationship clearly is in evidence.
The present findings are contradictory to the Wytucki (1990)
study that reported no relationships between death penalty
attitudes or death-qualification and competency for
execution decisions made by forensic psychologists.
of the two studies were similar.

Designs

The four DSM-III-R

diagnoses were the same, as was the demonstrated
symptomatology.

The test scores were virtually identical,

as was the description of the inmate's current behavior on
death-row.

An important difference between the two studies,

however, was the amount of information provided in the crime
description.

The Wytucki (1990) design allowed for only one
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crime description, and details were not elaborated.

It was

simply stated that the inmate had been convicted of shooting
and killing a convenience store clerk during the course of
an armed robbery.

The present study, on the other hand,

varied the crime description to include aggravating
circumstances, such as a heinous description that portrayed
the inmate not only stabbing the clerk to death, but then
dismembering and burying the body parts.

A clearly

premeditated condition served as an aggravating factor as
well.

This was in contrast to an impulsive crime condition.

Impulsivity has frequently been utilized in similar designs
to suggest lessened responsibility on the part of the
defendant, i.e„, a mitigating circumstance (Luginbuhl &
Middendorf, 1988).

These manipulations did appear to affect

the outcome of the study, and this effect is discussed at
length in a later section.

Briefly, the death-qualified

psychologists who received the heinous and premeditated
crime conditions evaluated the inmate as competent to be
executed significantly more often than did the deathqualified psychologists who received the non-heinous and
impulsive crime conditions or the excludable psychologists
who received the same crime conditions.

It does seem

plausible, therefore, that all else equal, the contradictory
findings of this and the Wytucki (1990) study may be in part
attributable to the experimental manipulations undertaken in
the present study.

When the psychologists here had access
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to additional information that did not pertain to the
behavior in question (the inmate's current behavior on
death-row), the death-qualified psychologists who received
heinous or premeditated crime descriptions apparently were
less able than the excludable psychologists to disregard
this knowledge as irrelevant to the task at hand and assess
only what was relevant to the issue of competency to be
executed, i.e., the current mental status of the client.
This tends to support the concerns of Heilbrun (1987),
Grisso (1986), and other forensic psychologists who have
pointed out the potential for a wide degree of variability
in the way a psychologist may approach the problem of
determining competency for execution.

What is relevant to

the issue of competency for execution and what is not has
yet to be empirically determined, nor has the domain of
behavior that is actually being assessed.

These data

reiterate the need for a standardized format that would:
a) clearly elucidate the scope of information the examiner
should have access to, and b) unmistakenly define the
parameters of the competency evaluation in terms of specific
questions the examiner should address.
Death penalty attitudes and their correlates have been
studied extensively among perspective jurors, but associated
factors that have been examined have generally been
conviction-proneness, favoring the prosecution, and
rejection of the insanity defense.

The issue of competency
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has never been addressed.

Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984)

have suggested that the tendency for death-qualified jurors
to trust the prosecution more than the defense, vote for
conviction more often than acquittal and mistrust the
insanity defense may be attributable .:o contrasting
ideological orientations held by those who favor or oppose
the death penalty.

These authors and others, such as

Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson (1984), postulate
that excludable jurors tend to support due-process values
that emphasize the fallibility of the criminal justice system
in apprehending, trying, and convicting lawbreakers.

Death-

qualified jurors, they argue, tend to embrace crime-control
values.

Crime-control values support the contention that

the most important function of the criminal justice system
is repressing crime.

The basic assumption of the crime-

control ideology has been stated "anyone who breaks the law
should pay the price, regardless of due-process guarantees,
and that society must protect itself against criminals by
means of swift, certain, and severe punishment."

Unlike

jurors, however, psychologists are trained and ethically
obligated to evaluate clients in an objective, unbiased
fashion.

At no time in a psychologist's career will the

burden of responsibility be so profound in its consequences
to all parties directly and indirectly involved than in the
case of assessing competency to be executed.

It seems

implausible, therefore, to consider that underlying
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sociopolitical orientations could derail scientific
objectivity.

A more plausible explanation for the

relationship between death-qualification and a determination
of competency for execution demonstrated in the present
study may be that death-qualified and excludable
psychologists adhere to contrasting philosophical
orientations on the issue that Wrightsman (1991) has called
"the first dilemma" in the relationship between psychology
and law:

the rights of individuals versus the rights of the

accused.

Wrightsman has asserted that psychologists must

choose between four contrasting roles they will play within
the criminal justice system:

"pure" scientist, applied

scientist, policy evaluator, or advocate.

If the

psychologist perceives himself/herself to be an advocate,
then they must decide which values the law should reflect:
protection of the rights of specific individuals, or
protection of society at large.

The present study did not

assess the respondents perceived role within the legal
system, nor did it address the larger issue of the
psychologists' value systems in terms of the rights of
society versus the rights of the accused.

Future

investigators might consider that development of a scale
that would quantify these perceptions would be an asset to
research in this area.

Although speculative, it seems

plausible that psychologists who are so strongly opposed to
the death penalty that they would refuse to impose it even
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when aggravating circumstances, or those factors that make a
particular murder even worse than a ’’typical'' murder are
involved (excludable psychologists) might tend to hold
values consistent with protecting the rights of specific
individuals, in this case, the accused.

Psychologists who

admit that they would consider aggravating factors in some
cases and be willing to impose the death penalty accordingly
(death-qualified psychologists) might tend to embrace values
more consistent with protection of society at large, or the
common good.

Such a theory might predict that death-

qualified psychologists could conceivably be more attentive
or sensitive to aggravating factors than excludable
psychologists.

The present study tends to support this

hypothesis.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
With respect to aggravating circumstances, results
indicated a significanc difference between death-qualified
and excludable psychologists over all aggravating
circumstances (heinous crime and premeditated crime).

There

was not, however, a significant overall difference between
death-qualified and excludable psychologists with respect to
mitigating circumstances (impulsive crime and
psychopathology).

Specifically, it was found that when the

inmate’s crime had been premeditated or heinous, the
psychologists who rated themselves as favoring the death
penalty (regardless of death-qualified or excludable
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classification) and the psychologists who indicated they
would be willing to impose the death penalty (deathqualified) were more likely to assess the inmate competent
for execution than were the psychologists who rated
themselves in opposition to the death penalty and those who
indicated that they would be unwilling to impose the death
penalty (excludable).

In contrast, when the inmate's crime

was impulsive or non-heinous, the competency ratings of the
psychologists were statistically equivalent.

It seems

possible that cases in which the victim was treated in an
extremely violent and heinous manner could intensify moral
outrage and heighten feelings of social and moral obligation
to the victim and society at large while accentuating the
perception of dangerousness on the part of the perpetrator.
The perceived need to protect society from such dangerous
elements by the surest means available could conceivably
reduce the dissonance associated with the implication or
assessing that individual as competent to be executed.
Thus, it may be that death-qualified psychologists tend to
interpret evidence in a way that allows for a measure of
consistency between their ideological orientations toward
the death penalty and reduce any dissonance that might be
associated with finding a death-row inmate competent to be
executed, which some authors have claimed is tantamount to
"assisting" with an execution (Radelet & Barnard, 1986).
The present findings are in accordance with those of
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Luginbuhl and Middendorf (1988) who demonstrated that in a
sample of potential jurors, there was a significant
difference between death-qualified and excludable jurors
over all aggravating circumstances, but no overall
difference in regard to mitigating circumstances, with the
exception of one particular mitigating factor.

The

excludable jurors were significantly more likely to accept
emotional disturbance as a mitigating circumstance than were
the death-qualified jurors.

Although no statistical

relationship between willingness to impose the death penalty
and any mitigating factors emerged in the present study, the
majority of excludable psychologists found for "not”
competent for execution on the part of the death-row inmate
under two conditions of psychopathology:

paranoid

schizophrenia (63%) and organic brain syndrome (56%).

The

majority (66%) of death-qualified psychologists, however,
found for "competent" for execution under the organic brain
syndrome condition.

Under the paranoid schizophrenia

condition their decisions were evently split with 50%
determining the schizophrenic competent and 50% determining
him not competent.
directly comparable.

The two studies, of course, are not
The populations and research questions

investigated were vastly different.

It does appear,

however, that the decisions of the death-qualified
psychologists in the present study were influenced by
similar variables (i.e., variables that represented
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aggravating factors) that influenced the decisions of
death-qualified jurors.

The excludable psychologists in the

present study also appeared more willing to accept pathology
as a mitigating factor, similar to Luginbuhl and
Middendorf’s (1988) excludable jurors.

These authors

speculated that jurors with a death penalty bias foster
differing receptivity to evidence supporting aggravating and
mitigating circumstances than jurors who are fundamentally
opposed to the death penalty.
The present study also found that when the prisoner had
been previously diagnosed as antisocial personality
disorder, death-qualification, but not death penalty
attitude was significantly related to a finding of competent
for execution, i.e., those psychologists who favored the
death penalty were no more likely to evaluate the antisocial
inmate as competent for execution as were those who opposed
the death penalty, but the death-qualified psychologists
were significantly more likely to evaluate the antisocial
competent to be executed than were the excludable.

Although

speculative, it is conceivable that within the framework of
the proposed hypothesis, a diagnosis of antisocial
personality disorder could possibly be construed as an
aggravating rather than mitigating factor, and an
orientation denoting dangerousness that is enduring and
intractable in nature.

If so, such a diagnosis might serve

to attenuate potential dissonance associated with allowing
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the execution to proceed.

In any case, it does seem

possible that the psychologists in the present sample did
not view the antisocial disorder as a mitigating
circumstances that lessened the responsibility of the
inmate, since they rated the prisoner with antisocial
personality disorder as significantly more legally
responsible for committing the crime than the prisoners with
paranoid schizophrenia and organic brain disorder, and
equally responsible for his crime as the inmate diagnosed
previously as adjustment disorder (essentially, no
psychopathology).

Yet, when asked to evaluate the amount of

impact the previous pathology had on the commission of the
capital crime, the psychologists, both death-qualified and
excludable, rated the inmate with antisocial personality
disorder as much affected by the disorder as they believed
the paranoid schizophrenic and organic brain syndrome
inmates were affected by their pathologies.

Making the

distinction that sociopathy had an equal impact on behavior
as paranoid schizophrenia and organic grain syndrome but
equating it with no psychopathology with respect to legal
responsibility for behavior tends to suggest that neither
the death-qualified psychologists nor the excludable
psychologists tended to view antisocial personality disorder
as a mitigating circumstance.
Evaluation of Evidence
An interesting aspect of the present study was that
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while death penalty attitude was marginally related and
death-qualification was significantly related to the
competency decisions of the psychologists, these variables
were not related to any other decisions the psychologists
were asked to make.

When quantifying the impact the

psychopathology of the inmate had on the commission of the
crime, the inmate's legal responsibility for the crime, and
the likelihood that the inmate was malingering on death row,
the death-qualified and excludable psychologists were
statistically equivalent in their determinations.

Neither

did the two groups differ in their perceptions of how
heinous, impulsive, or premeditated the crimes were believed
to be.

they also rated the importance of the four

information sources (social history, crime description,
current behavior on death-row, and test scores) similarly.
Thus, the null hypotheses could not be rejected for every
decision the two groups of psychologists made with the
exception of the decision relating to competency to be
executed.

When making this decision, the death-qualified

psychologists were apparently more attentive to the crime
description and more sensitive to it when it reflected the
presence of aggravating factors.

The diagnosis of

sociopathy also appeared to affect the death-qualified's
competency decisions.
Factors Associated with Competency for Execution
The inmate assessed as competent for execution was
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generally believed by both the death-qualified and the
excludable psychologists to be less affected by his previous
psychopathology and more legally responsible for his actions
during the commission of the crime than was the incompetent
inmate.

A large difference was demonstrated between the

legal responsibility ratings given by the psychologists who
later assessed the inmate incompetent for execution and the
psychologists who later determined that he was competent.

A

score of 7.00 indicated that the psychologists believed the
inmate was "completely” legally responsible for his actions
during the commission of the crime.

A score of 1.00

indicated that the inmate was determined to be "not at all"
legally responsible.

The mean score for the psychologists

who later assessed the inmate competent for execution was
6.16, compared to A.71 for the psychologists who later
assessed the inmate as incompetent to be executed.

This

tends to raise the interesting notion that the psychologists
in the present sample may have conceived of competency for
execution as existing on a continuum with other legal
competencies, e.g., the legal competency of the inmate at
the time of the crime in question and during the trial
proceedings.

It was stated in the crime description that

the defendant's competency was not raised as an issue at the
time of the capital trial.

These results tend to suggest

that the psychologists who believed that the prisoner was
legally competent when he committed the crime and when he
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was tried in court also believed that he was competent at the
time of the request for an evaluation for competency for
execution.

The psychologists who rated the prisoner

incompetent or of questionable competency when he committed
the crime also appeared to remain consistent in their belief
that the prisoner was still incompetent and should not be
executed under the circumstances.

Further supporting

evidence for such a contention is demonstrated by the selfrated importance the psychologists attached to the various
information sources from which they formulated their
competency decisions.

Each subject was supplied with four

sources of information related to the death-row inmate.
They were asked to rate each information source in terms of
its overall importance in their competency for execution
decision-making process.

The inmate's social history was

unremarkable and depicted normal development until late
adolescence, at which time the prisoner began to demonstrate
symptomatology consistent with one of the four
psychopathologies.
included.

A formal DMS III-R diagnosis was

The crime description not only detailed the

prisoner's crime but included the statement "the defendant's
competency was not raised as an issue at the time of the
trial."

The test scores were designed to reflect the DSM

III-R diagnosis contained in the social history.

The WAIS-R

indicated that the inmate was functioning in the average
range of intellectual capacity, and the MMPI-1 was
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consistent with moderate symptomatology.

This information

source pointed out, however, that, the test battery had been
administered 3 years prior to the currently requested
competency evaluation, at the time of the inmate's admission
to death-row.
not current.

Thus, it was noted that the test scores were
Finally, a description of the inmate's current

behavior, which had caused his attorney to question his
competency to be executed was provided.

This was designed

to reflect a degree of ambiguity, in that at times the
prisoner appeared lucid and oriented and at other times,
frankly psychotic.

Interestingly, the two groups of

psychologists (those who determined competent versus those
who determined not competent for execution) maintained a
high degree of consistency in their decisions across
different inmate behaviors related to the issue of
competency.

Those who rated the inmate as legally

responsible at the time of the crime tended to also rate the
prisoner as malingering on death-row and therefore attached
little significance to the inmates questionable current
behavior.

Instead, they endorsed the three-year-old test

scores and crime description as more important in
formulating their competency decision, and in the end,
assessed the inmate as competent to be executed.

A rank

ordering of means indicated that those psychologists who
found for competency for execution considered first the
prisoner's test scores, then the crime description, followed
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by the social history, and finally, his current behavior on
death-row.

Those psychologists who apparently questioned

the legal competency of the inmate at the time of the crime
in question, however, did not appear to doubt the
authenticity of the behavior on death-row, and indeed
attached significantly greater importance to the inmate's
current behavior than to any other source of information,
and to finally conclude that the inmate was incompetent for
execution.

Rank ordering of means for the psychologists who

found for incompetency to be executed demonstrated that they
endorsed the inmate's current behavior on death row as the
most important criteria for the formulation of their
decision, followed by his test scores, then the social
history, and finally, the crime description.
Limitations of the Present Study
The validity of this study's results and the extent to
which they can be generalized to other populations are
restricted primarily by sample characteristics and the
limitations associated with survey methodology.

More

importantly, the present study was correlational in nature,
and thus is limited in discerning causative factors or
explaining directionality in existing relationships.
The present study investigated a sensitive and complex
issue that required thoughtful self-examination.

The survey

format utilizing self-administered questionnaires appeared
to be the most practical and appropriate means of obtaining
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the research goals while ensuring the confidentiality of
respondents.

In the context of validity and reliability,

survey research is frequently seen as generally weak on the
former and strong on the latter (Babbie, 1979).

There is an

artificiality associated with the survey format.

People's

opinions on issues seldom take the form of strongly
agreeing, agreeing, disagreeing, or strongly disagreeing
with a specific statement.

This, together with the

potential differences between subjects who choose to respond
to a survey and those who choose not to respond puts a
strain on its validity.

Survey research, however, by

presenting all subjects with a standardized stimulus, helps
in eliminating unreliability in observations made by the
researcher.

Moreover, careful wording and ordering of the

questions can also reduce the subjects' own unreliability.
The overall response rate is one guide to the
representativeness of the sample respondents.
study achieved an overall response rate of 40%.

The present
Although

adequate for analyses and within generally acceptable
limits, this relatively low return is a serious limitation
that raises the concern that a significant response bias may
have occurred.

It could be argued, however, that the

professionals sampled in the present study may have
perceived themselves as personally invested in its outcome,
from both a professional and an economic vantage point.
Therefore, one might expect that the respondents would

Ill
attempt to present themselves in an even more positive light
than what research indicates most survey subjects do.
phenomenon, however, did not appear to occur.

This

The

responding psychologists did admit to strong biases either
in favor of or against the death penalty.

Furthermore, 45

(14%) of the respondents took the time from their busy
schedules to include lengthy comments about their personal
feelings related to the topic, or wrote separate letters.
One respondent wrote the investigator a 3-page letter and
included two examples of competency evaluations he had
submitted to the courts.

Another fed all the data describing

the inmate’s test scores into his personal computer program
and generated a written profile of the inmate.

He then

personally called the investigator to discuss his opinions
related to the design and the implications of psychologists
participating in such areas of controversy.

Still another

participant called the investigator's advisor to express
various concerns.

The following examples are some of the

psychologist's additional comments and attest to the high
degree of emotional intensity the present study apparently
generated among some participants:

"I would guess that, on

the basis of this study, you will try to publish a paper
reaching conclusions about psychologists' judgements about
competency.

I believe that this is a good example of the

triumph of a false 'scientism' in psychology.... I also
believe that 'analogue' studies are a waste of time."
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Another psychologist, wrote:

"Please don't let me hurt your

student efforts by requesting a response by sending me a
reminder letter or a second mail-out...

I can't support this

survey as, as described, it is an unacceptable try at
research for a psychology doctorate."
psychologist wrote:

Still another

"You are presumptious to undertake a

study of such serious nature in a population of experts...
Should you attempt to publish results in any reputable
journal, critical analysis would be overwhejming.

I would

not waste my time on such a fruitless endeavor."
It is understandable that many psychologists
demonstrated negative affective responses to the present
topic.

The participation of psychologists, psychiatrists,

and other medical professionals in the execution process is
highly controversial, with the two opposing sides elegantly
arguing their ethical concerns.

Fifty-nine psychologists

(18%) of the 322 respondents in the present study had
actually evaluated inmates on death-row to determine their
competency.

These psychologists were statistically as

likely to be excludable as death-qualified.

The 59

psychologists had completed a total of 260 competency for
execution evaluations.

Only five psychologists who included

critical assessments of the study or the topic itself came
from the group who had actually been a part of the
competency for execution process.

The remaining 40 comments

came from psychologists who had never participated.

Of the
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total number of comments or feedback received (45), 69% came
from death-qualified psychologists.

The topic itself could

be profoundly disturbing to many psychologists and their
death penalty attitudes may be intensely personal.

It is

possible that some of the psychologists construed the
present study as an attempt to challenge their credibility
or moral character.
the investigation.

This was not, however, the purpose of
The goal, rather, was to systematically

determine the kinds of factors and information that
psychologists consider salient to the issue of competency
for execution, and to correlate death penalty attitudes with
competency determinations.
On a more positive note, 45% of the respondents
requested an abstract of the results, including most of the
psychologists who attached negative comments and criticisms.
A few respondents had favorable reactions to the study.
such psychologist wrote:

One

"This is worthwhile research on a

topic of utmost importance and interest in the world of
forensic psychology."

Considering the degree of emotional

involvement evidenced by the relatively large number of
psychologists who included unsolicited comments and
material, it seems possible that response-bias did not
significantly affect the study's outcome.

Unbiased data

would appear to be a more favorable attribute than a high
response rate.
The present design provided limited data pertaining to
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the death row inmate.

This was done to facilitate the

probability of a response and for reasons of economic
feasibility.

Many respondents attached comments to their

returns indicating that the data provided was insufficient
to make an adequate determination of competency.
is V7ell-taken.

This point

The cost of a "real world" non-analog

design, however, would have been prohibitive and likely to
lower the response rate, based on the time-consuming task of
reading and interpreting extensive data.

Future research,

however, would do well to closely approximate the actual
assessment procedures taking place on death row, and provide
for the subjects the same information to which the
evaluating psychologist has access.

Whenever possible,

actual material related to a "real world" situation should
be used, i.e., videotaped interviews with death-row
prisoners, and test batteries that have been administered to
real, rather than fictitious inmates.

Future surveys might

attempt to elicit information that would clarify the role
within the criminal justice system forensic psychologists
perceive themselves to play:
"pure" scientist.

be it that of "advocate" or

The latter role is rate within our

present system (Wrightsman, 1991).

Wrightsman has asserted

that regardless of the professional's own viewpoint, the
lawyers, jury and the judge tend to perceive the
psychologist as an advocate, and as such, he/she is expected
to align their loyalty with one side or the other i.e., the
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prosecution or the defense, or more globally, the protection
of the rights of specific individuals, or the common good of
society at large.

Collection of such data might help to

disentangle the complex relationships between attitudes
related to the death penalty and the various decisions
psychologists are asked to make.
Conclusion
More than three-fourths of United States citizens
support the death penalty (Wrightsman, 1991).

The

percentage has increased in recent years, reflecting a
national shift toward the crime-control model and away from
the due-process model of criminal justice values (Walker,
1985).

It does not appear likely that the Supreme Court

will reject the death penalty in the near future.

There

will remain a conflict between law and psychology, based on
the increasing demand for psychological services to
defendants as well as prisoners facing sentences of death.
The conflict is reflected in the preamble to the Code of
Ethical Principles of Psychologists:

"Psychologists respect

the dignity and worth of the individual and strive for the
preservation and protection of fundamental human rights.
They are committed to increasing knowledge of human behavior
and of people's understanding of themselves and others and
to the utilization of such knowledge for the promotion of
human welfare.... "

Each psychologist must decide for

him/herself whether or not participation in competency for
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execution evaluations is ethnically defensible.

The dilemma

will become more profound with the recent publication of
Justice Sandra O'Connor's majority opinion stating:

"There

is unsufficient evidence of a national consensus against
executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital
offenses for us to conclude that it is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment" (cruel and unusual punishment)
(Wrightsman, 1991).

This opinion is in reference to a

severely retarded black man with an IQ of 66 electrocuted in
Virginia in 1985.

In the only systematic clinical

investigation of the neuropsychiatric status of individuals
condemned to death, Lewis, Pincus, Feldman, Jackson, & Bard
(1986) conclude that "the possibility exists that death-row
inmates comprise an especially neuropsychiatrically impaired
prison population whose pervasive inadequacies make them
less capable than other defendants either of obtaining
competent representation at the time of the trial or
assisting their attorneys in the time-consuming work of
documenting the kinds of neuropsychiatric impairments that
would be significant for mitigation,"
As the number of individuals who have lived for years
on death row increases, so too will the number of pleas of
execution incompetency.

More and more capital inmates may

be expected to develop serious mental illness, and
psychologists will be called upon to evaluate or treat them
in ever-increasing numbers.

At present, there is little
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consensus among states on the test for competency for
execution (Heilbrun, 1987).

The present study demonstrates

a similar lack of consensus among psychologists in regard to
the behavior of an inmate that may suggest incompetency.
The competency decisions of the psychologists in the present
sample appeared to be influenced by factors other than the
current mental status of the inmate in question.

This

indicates a clear and pressing need to clarify the nature of
competency for execution.

Particularly relevant is the need

to define and standardize the domain of behavior that is to
be assessed.

Further research should be directed toward

disentangling the complex relationship between the
examiner's own attitudes and potential biases and the
objective decisions they are asked to render.

Competency

for execution presents far more compelling ethical questions
for mental health professionals than do other legal
competencies yet this area of research has been virtually
ignored.

Clearly, the topic is amenable to systematic

scientific investigation and, sensitivities aside, further
research is warranted to determine who is appropriate to
administer such assessments and how they should proceed.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
CONSENT FORM
You are cordially invited to participate in a
dissertation study that is intended to investigate attitudes
among psychologists related to the death penalty, the
insanity defense, and the question of competency for
execution.
You have been selected randomly from all male Ph.D.
clinical psychologists listing forensic services in the
National Registry of Health Service Providers.
Your name
will never be attached to the data you provide, or used in
any way. Your participation is strictly confidential and on
a voluntary basis.
If you choose to participate, we feel you will
contribute valuable data that will serve to clarify the
complex and sensitive issues surrounding the insanity
defense and competency of death-row inmates for execution.
While realizing that in real-life settings, your
decisions regarding such profound issues would be based on a
thoughtful and comprehensive review of any and all relevant
information, we nave elected to be sensitive to your
time-demands by limiting the data we hope to collect from
you. Fifteen minutes of your time would be required to read
the enclosed material and complete a brief 11-item
questionnaire based on the social history, crime
description, and current behavior of a fictitious death-row
inmate.
For your convenience, a self-addressed, stamped
envelope is included for returning the consent form, and
questionnaire.
Please respond and return the questionnaires
as soon as possible.
Results of the study will be mailed to
you upon request.
Your time and cooperation is greatly appreciated.
I,
______________________ have read all of the above and
willingly agree to participate in the study.
If you have any questions regarding the present study,
feel free to direct them to Sharon Brown, M.A., Department
of Psychology, University of North Dakota (701-777-3451).
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APPENDIX B
WITHERSPOON DEATH QUALIFICATION CRITERIA
Assume that you have been called as a possible juror in
a capital case.

Answer the following questions as

accurately as possible.
Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat
opposed, or strongly opposed to the death penalty?
STRONGLY IN FAVOR........

1

SOMEWHAT IN FAVOR............ .2
SOMEWHAT OPPOSED.........

3

STRONGLY OPPOSED.............. 4
Now assume that you've been called as a possible juror
in a first degree murder trial.
for the death sentence.

The prosecutor is asking

Since this is a case where the

death penalty may be imposed, the judge will ask you certain
questions about your attitudes toward the death penalty
before deciding whether you should be chosen to serve on
the jury.
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There are two parts to any trial where the death
penalty may be imposed.

In the first part, the jury decides

whether the person on trial is guilty or not guilty.

If the

person is found guilty, there is a second part--a separate
trial--in which the jury decides whether he or she should
get the death penalty, or life in prison.
The judge will ask you the following question:
"Is your attitude toward the death penalty such that as
a juror you would be unwilling to impose it in any case, no
matter what the evidence was, or would you consider voting
to impose it in at least some cases?"
How would you answer?

Would you say...

(READ EACH ANSWER CHOICE)
I WOULD BE UNWILLING TO VOTE TO
IMPOSE IT IN ANY CASE...................
OR:

1

I WOULD CONSIDER VOTING TO IMPOSE
IT IN SOME CASES........................

2

Now suppose that you were a juror in the first part of
the trial, just to decide whether the accused person is
guilty or not guilty of the crime.

The judge instructs you

that in reaching your verdict you are only allowed to
consider the evidence presented in court, and must follow
the law as he will state it to you.

If the accused is found

guilty, there will be a separate trial to decide whether or
not he or she should get the death penalty.
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Which of the following expresses what you would do if
you were a juror for the first part, of the trial?
(READ EACH ANSWER CHOICE).
I WOULD FOLLOW THE JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND
DECIDE THE QUESTION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE IN A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL MANNER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE AND
LAW..................................................
OR:

1

I WOULD NOT BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN DECIDING THE
QUESTION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE, KNOWING THAT IF
THE PERSON WAS CONVICTED HE OR SHE MIGHT GET THE
DEATH PENALTY........................................

2

APPENDIX C
SOCIAL HISTORY:

PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIC

The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old,
never married, Caucasian male.
a successful restaurant.

His parents own and operate

They report that Mr. Jones

progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal
rate.

There is no history of physical, sexual, or

psychologist abuse.

Mr. Jones graduated from high school

with a 2.00 grade-point average and enrolled in a local
business college.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones began to

demonstrate social withdrawal, evidenced by long periods of
seclusion in his dormitory room.

His grades markedly

deteriorated as his behavior became increasingly more
bizarre.

He reported that he was a messenger from God and

that Satan and his disciples were trying to poison him.

He

maintained that he often heard the voice of Satan mocking
him.

Shortly after his twentieth birthday, Mr. Jones was

hospitalized and diagnosed by a clinical psychologist as a
paranoid schizophrenic.

He was discharged after four weeks
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APPENDIX D
SOCIAL HISTORY:

ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER

The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old,
never married, Caucasian male.
a successful restaurant.

His parents own and operate

They report that Mr. Jones

progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal
rate.

There is no history of physical, sexual, or

psychologist abuse.

At the age of 12, Mr. Jones began to

demonstrate frequent truancy from school,1 cruelty to his
peers, and a propensity to engage in frequent fighting.

He

graduated from high school with a 2.00 grade-point average
and enrolled in a local business college.

Shortly

thereafter, Mr. Jones was arrested for minor property
damage.

Several other convictions followed, including

shoplifting, and drunk driving.

Shortly after his twentieth

birthday, Mr. Jones was incarcerated for theft and underwent
a court-ordered psychological evaluation.

He was diagnosed

by a clinical psychologist as anti-social personality
disorder.

He was released from jail after a period of four

weeks.
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APPENDIX E
SOCIAL HISTORY:

ORGANIC BRAIN SYNDROME

The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old,
never married, Caucasian male.
a successful restaurant.

His parents own and operate

They report that Mr. Jones

progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal
rate.

There is no history of physical, sexual, or

psychological abuse.

He graduated from high school with a

2.00 grade-point average and enrolled in a local business
college.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones was involved in a

motorcycle accident which resulted in severe head trauma.
He began to demonstrate affectively unstable behavior,
marked by frequent fluctuations between depression, anxiety,
and irritability.

On occasion, he demonstrated aggressive

outbursts and reported suspicion of the motive of others.
He was hospitalized shortly after his twentieth birthday and
diagnosed by a clinical psychologist as organic brain
syndrome.

He was discharged in four weeks.
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APPENDIX F
SOCIAL HISTORY:

ADJUSTMENT DISORDER WITH ANXIOUS MOOD

The defendant, Mr. Anthony Jones, is a 24 year old,
never married, Caucasian male.
a successful restaurant.

His parents own and operate

They report that Mr. Jones

progressed through all developmental milestones at a normal
rate.

There is no history of physical, sexual, or

psychological abuse.

Mr. Jones graduated from high school

with a 2.00 grade-point average and enrolled in a local
business college.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Jones began to

experience anxiety related to the demands of a current
relationship and maintaining his academic goals.

Shortly

after his twentieth birthday, he voluntarily sought therapy
from a clinical psychologist, who indicated that Mr. Jones
demonstrated some features of adjustment disorder with
anxious mood.

Mr. Jones continued in therapy for a period

of four weeks.
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APPENDIX G
CRIME DESCRIPTION:

HEINOUS/IMPULSIVE

On the night of September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his
own admission, entered a convenience store and demanded all
of the money in the register.

The clerk, alone in the store

at the time, complied with this request.

Upon receipt of

the money, Mr. Jones gagged the victim with the victim's
handkerchief and bound his hands with rope he found in the
store.

He led the victim to a wooded area behind the

convenience store and proceeded to torture the victim until
the victim appeared to lose consciousness.

Mr. Jones

admitted that he then dismembered the body with the victim's
hunting knife and hid the remains in the convenience store
dumpster.

A diary found in Mr. Jones's possession at the

time of the arrest indicated that he was concerned over his
recent impulsive spending of a small inheritance and his
increasing debt, but did not allude to the crime in
question.

The defendant was found guilty of armed robbery

and first degree murder and sentenced to death.

The

defendant's competency was not raised as an issue at the
time of the trial.
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APPENDIX H
CRIME DESCRIPTION:

HEINOUS/PREMEDITATED

On the night of September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his
own admission, entered a convenience store armed with a
knife and demanded all of the money in the register.

The

clerk, alone in the store at the time, complied with this
request.

Upon receipt of the money, Mr. Jones bound and

gagged the victim with rope he had purchased earlier in the
day.

He transported the victim in his own vehicle to a

pre-selected secluded area outside the city limits, where he
proceeded to torture the victim until the victim appeared to
lose consciousness.

Mr. Jones then admitted chat he

dismembered the victim and buried the dismembered body parts
in several different locations.

A diary found in Mr.

Jones's possession at the time of the arrest contained a
detailed description of the convenience store and the
secluded location at which the dismembered body parts were
later recovered.

The entry was dated 3 days prior to the

date the crime was committed.

The defendant was found

guilty of armed robbery and first degree murder and
sentenced to death.

The defendant's competency was not

raised as an issue at the time of the trial.
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APPENDIX I
CRIME DESCRIPTION:

NON-HEINOUS/IMPULSIVE

On the night cf September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his
own admission, entered a convenience store and demanded all
the money in the register.

The clerk, alone in the store at

the time, complied with this request.

Upon receipt of the

money, Mr. Jones stabbed the victim with his own hunting
knife and fled the scene.

A diary found in Mr. Jones's

possession at the time of arrest indicated that he was
concerned over his recent impulsive spending of a small
inheritance and his increasing debt, but did not allude to
the crime in question.

The defendant was found guilty of

armed robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to
death.

The defendant's competency was not raised as an

issue at the time of the trial.
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APPENDIX J
CRIME DESCRIPTION:

NON-HEINOUS/PREMEDITATED

On. the night of September 14, 1987, Mr. Jones, by his
own admission, entered a convenience store armed with a
knife and demanded all the money in the register.

The

clerk, alone in the store at the time, complied with this
request.

Upon receipt of the money, Mr. Jones transported

the victim in his own vehicle to a pre-selected secluded
area outside the city limits.

He stabbed the victim and

buried the body in a shallow grave he had prepared earlier
in the day.

A diary found in Mr. Jones's possession at the

time cf arrest contained a detailed description of the
convenience store and the secluded location of the victim's
grave.

The entry was dated 3 days prior to the date the

crime was committed.

The defendant was found guilty of armed

robbery and first degree murder and sentenced to death.
defendant's competency was not raised as an issue at the
time of the trial.
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APPENDIX K
CURRENT BEHAVIOR ON DEATH ROW
Since the sentencing, Mr. Jones has spent 3 years on
death row.

During this time, he has been described by the

guards as an "ideal inmate."

His execution has been delayed

due to ongoing appeals by his attorney.

Recently Mr. Jones

has demonstrated behavior that has caused his attorney to
question his competency.

His attorney has requested that a

psychological evaluation be administered to determine if his
client is competent for execution.

The results of the

evaluation indicated that while at times, Mr. Jones appears
very lucid and oriented, he frequently becomes very
withdrawn and refuses to speak.

Occasionally, he will

remain tightly curled in a fetal position for hours.

During

these times, Mr. Jones appears to be unaware of his
impending execution, as he indicates to the examiner that he
will be going home soon and that he has no idea why he is in
prison.
kill him.

He voices the fear that prison guards are trying to
Within the last month he has demonstrated one

episode of unconstrained violence where he attacked a guard.
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised and the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were
administered upon Mr. Jones's admission to prison.
scores were as follows:
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APPENDIX L
TEST SCORES:

PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIC

WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Verbal Tests

Performance Tests

Information

13

Picture Completion

14

Digit Span

12

Picture Arrangement

14

Vocabulary

13

Block Design

10

Arithmetic

12

Object Assembly

10

Digit Symbol

10

Comprehens ion
Similarities
Total

9
9
68

Total
VERBAL IQ

105

PERFORMANCE IQ
107
FULL SCALE IQ
106
MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L
F

50
80

Hs+5K

53

D

57

K

52

Hy

55

Pd+4K

64

Mf

52

Pa

75

Pt+IK

52

Sc+IK

80

Ma+2K

64

Si

53
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APPENDIX M
TEST SCORES:

ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Performance Tests

Verbal Tests
Information

12

Picture Completion

10

Digit Span

10

Picture Arrangement

14

Vocabulary

11

Block Design

11

Arithmetic

11

Object Assembly

10

Comprehens ion

11

Digit Symbol

Similarities

13

Total

68

9
Total

VERBAL IQ

105

PERFORMANCE IQ
105
FULL SCALE IQ

105

MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L

50

Hs+5K

52

F

70

D

58

K

48

Hy

55

Pd+4K

75

Mf

51

Pa

53

Pt+IK

52

Sc+IK

67

Ma+2K

74

Si

40
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APPENDIX N
TEST SCORES:

ORGANIC BRAIN SYNDROME

WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Performance Tests

Verbal Tests
Information

13

Digit Span

8

Vocabulary

13

Arithmetic

104

Comprehens ion
Similarities
Total

13
10

Picture Completion

11

Picture Arrangement

11

Block Design

7

Object Assembly

8

Digit Symbol

66

10
Total

VERBAL IQ

108

PERFORMANCE IQ
92
FULL SCALE IQ

100

MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L
F

60

K

49

70

134

Hs+5K
D
Hy

57

Pd+4K

68

Mf

51

Pa
Pt+IK

53
52

Sc+IK

80

Ma+2K

70

Si

52

70
77

47

APPENDIX N
TEST SCORES:

ADJUSTMENT DISORDER WITH ANXIOUS MOOD
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
WAIS-R SCALED SCORES
Performance Tests

Verbal Tests
Information

12

Picture Completion

11

Picture Arrangement

10

Digit Span

8

Vocabulary

11

Block Design

Arithmetic

Object Assembly

11

Comprehens ion

9
12

Digit Symbol

11

Similarities

12

Total

64

9

Total
VERBAL IQ

104

PERFORMANCE IQ
104
FULL SCALE IQ

104

MMPI-1 PROFILE T SCORES
L 30
Hs+5K 70
F 70
D
75
K

45

135

Hy
Pd+4K

56

Mf

51

Pa

52

Pt+IK

65

Sc+IK

53

Ma+2K

53

Si

52

57

52

APPENDIX P
QUESTIONNAIRE
Based on the defendant's social history, crime description,
current behavior, and test scores, please answer the
following questions:
1.

Given the information provided, how heinous do you feel
the defendant's crime was?
Not at alJ

Extremely

heinous

heinous

1

2.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Given the information provided, how impulsive was the
defendant's behavior during the commission of the crime?
Not at all

Extremely

impulsive

impulsive

1

3.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Given the information provided, how much impact did the
defendant's clinical condition have on Lae commission
of the crime?
No impact
1

Extreme impact
2

3

4

5
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6

7
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4.

Given the information provided, what is your assessment
of the defendant's legal responsibility for his actions
during the commission of the crime?
Not legally

Legally

responsible

responsible

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Given the information provided, how likely is it that
the defendant's current behavior on death-row is
malingering?
Not at all likely
1
6.

2

Very likely
3

4

5

6

7

Based ou the information presented, do you believe the
defendant is competent, in a legal sense, to be
executed (i.e., is he aware of his impending execution
and the reasons for it)?

7.

Yes ____

No ____

Using numbers from the Likert format below, please
indicate how important the following factors were m
determining your decision regarding the defendant's
competency Lo be executed:
Not at all important
1

2

Very important
3

4

____ Current Behavior on Death Row
____ Crime Description
8.

5

6

7

____ Social history

____ Test Scores (MMPI, WAIS-R)

How many times in the last 5 years have you, in your
capacity as a psychologist, testified in court regarding
the legal competency of a defendant?

_______ times.
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9.

Have you ever been involved in the assessment of
competency for execution?
Yes

___

No ____

If yes, how many t i m e s " ________ times
10.

Please indicate your attitude regarding the death
penalty:
Strongly in favor..........1
Somewhat in favor..........2
Somewhat in favor..........3
Strongly opposed........... A

11.

Is your attitude toward the death penalty such that, as
a juror, you would be:
Unwilling to vote to impose it in any case.......

1

Willing to consider voting to impose it in
some cases.........................................

2

YOUR TIME AND CONSIDERATION IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

PLEASE RETURN ALL THREE PAGES OF

THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND YOUR CONSENT FORM IN THE ENCLOSED
SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED ENVELOPE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!

APPENDIX Q
STATES (AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) WITH AND
WITHOUT THE DEATH PENALTY
Alabama.............................

Yes

Arizona..............................................

Yes

Arkansas.............................................

Yes

California...........................................

Yes

Colorado.............................................

Yes

Connecticut..........................................

Yes

Delaware............

Yes

Florida..............................................

Yes

Georgia..............................................

Yes

Idaho................................................

Yes

Illinois.............................................

Yes

Indiana..............................................

Yes

Kentucky.............................................

Yes

Louisiana.............................. .............

Yes

Maryland.... ........................................

Yes

Mississippi....................................

Yes

Missouri........

Yes

Montana. ..............................................

Yes

Nebraska. .............................................

Yes

Nevada...............................................

Yes
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New Hampshire...........................................

Yes

New Jersey..............................................

Yes

New Mexico..............................................

Yes

North Carolina......................

Yes

Ohio..................................................... Yes
Oklahoma................................................

Yes

Oregon. ..............................................

Yes

Pennsylvania...........

Yes

South Carolina..........................................

Yes

South Dakota............................................

Yes

Tennessee...............................................

Yes

Texas...................................................

Yes

Utah....................................................

Yes

Virginia................................................

Yes

Washington..............................................

Yes

Wyoming.................................................

Yes

Alaska..................................................

No

District of Columbia....................................

No

Hawaii..................................................

No

Iowa.........

No

Kansas..................................................

No

Maine....................................................

No

Massachusetts...........................................

No

Michigan............

No
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Minnesota.......................

No

New York.................................................

No

North Dakota. .............................................

No

Rhode Island.............................................

No

Vermont..................................................

No

West Virginia............................................

No

Wisconsin. ..............................

No

APPENDIX R
REMINDER LETTER

11-23-90

MEMO:
This is just a reminder regarding the dissertation
questionnaires sent concerning competency for execution.
Your participation is very much appreciated, but strictly
voluntary.
Your contribution would provide valuable data.
If possible, please respond.
Thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
Sharon R. Brown, M.A.
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